Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
283
Seerct NOFORN
Chapter 6
CHOOSING PILOTS FOR OXCART
Just as in the U-2 program, the Air Force provided considerable sup
port to Project OXCART, including training, fuel storage, and weather
service. One of the most important areas of support was the provision
of pilots; all of the OXCART pilots came from the Air Force.
Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters
and be emotionally stable and well motivated. In contrast to 1955,
when cover considerations had limited the U-2 pilot selection process
to individuals with reserve commissions, the Air Force was able to
devise personnel and cover procedures that enabled both regular and
reserve officers to volunteer to become OXCART pilots. Because of
the limited size of the A-12 cockpit, they had to be under six feet tall
and weigh less than 175 pounds. Following extensive physical and
psychological screening, 16 potential nominees were selected for in
tensive security and medical screening by the Agency. By the end of
this screening in November l 961. only five individuals had been ap
proved and had accepted the Agency's offer of employment on a
highly classified project involving a very advanced aircraft. A second
search and screening raised the number of pilots for the OXCART to
eleven. The thorough screening process produced an elite group of pi-
•tots; all but one of these 11 officers eventually became generals. The
new pilots transferred from military to civilian status and received
compensation and insurance arrangements somewhat better than those
of the U-2 pilots.15
SELECTION OF A TESTING SITE FOR THE OXCART
From the very beginning, it was clear that Lockheed could not test the
OXCART aircraft at its Burbank facility, where the runway was too
short and too exposed to the public. The ideal testing site would be far
removed from metropolitan areas, away from civil and military air
ways, easily accessible by air, blessed with good weather, capable of
accommodating large numbers of personnel, near an Air Force instal
lation, and having a runway at least 8,000 feet long. But no such place
was to be found.
After considering 10 Air Force bases programmed for closing,
Richard Bissell decided to upgrade the Area 51 site in Nevada where
the U-2 had been tested. Although its personnel accommodations, fuel
'' Minnich. --OXCART Story."· pp. 6- 7 (S); OSA Hiswry. chap. 20. pp. -l8-50 (TS
Codeword); Geary interview with Pedlow (S).
Secaet

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.