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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
16
Chapter 1
Richard M. Bissell, Jr.
States might use against the Soviet Bloc in the event of another up
rising such as the East Berlin riots of June 1953. Bissell quickly
concluded that there was not much hope for clandestine operations
against Bloc nations. As he remark,ed later: "I know I emerged from
that exercise feeling that very little could be done." This belief
would later make Bissell a leading advocate of technical rather than
human means of intelligence collection.25
Bissell joined the Agency in late January 1954 and soon became
involved in coordination for the operation aimed a t overthrowing
Guatemalan President Jacobo Arbe1nz. He was, therefore very preoc
cupied when Philip Strong approached him in mid-May 1954 with the
concept of the proposed spyplane from Lockheed. Bissell said that the
idea had merit and told Strong to get some topflight scientists to ad
vise on the matter. Afterward he returned to the final planning for the
Guatemalan operation and promptly forgot about the CL-282.!0
Meanwhile, Strong went about drumming up support for high-al
titude overflight. In May 1954 he persuaded DCI Allen W. Dulles to
ask the Air Force to take the initiative in gaining approval for an
overflight of the Soviet guided-missile test range at Kapustin Yar.
Dulles's memorandum did not me,ntion the CL-282 or any of the
other proposed high-altitude aircraft. CIA and Air Force officials met
on several occasions to explore the ,overflight proposal, which the Air
Force finally turned down in October I 954.!'
Although Allen Dulles was willing to support an Air Force over
flight of the Soviet Union, he was mot enthusiastic about the CIA un
dertaking such a project. Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude
toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available,
but many who knew him believe that he did not want the CIA to be
come involved in projects that belonged to the military, and the
Lockheed CL-282 had been designed for an Air Force requirement.
" Thomas Powers. The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf. 1979). p. 79; Beschloss. Mayday. pp. 86-89.
,. Memorandum for H. Marshall Chadwell. Assistant Director/Scientific Intelligence.
from Chief. Support Staff, OSI. " Review of OSA Activities Concerned with Scientific and
Technical Collection Techniques:· 13 May 1955. p. 6. OSI (OSWR) records. job
S0R-0 1424. bo" I (S); Richard M. Bissell. Jr., interview by Donald E. Welzenbach. tape
recording. Farmington. Connecticut. 8 November 1984 {S).
" Memorandum for Richard M. Bissell. Speci,al Assistant to the Director for Planning and
Coordination. from Philip G. Strong, Chief. Operations Staff. OSI. --overflight of
Kapustin Yar.'' 15 October 1954. OSI (OSWR) records, job S0R-01424. bo" I (TS. down
graded 10 S).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.