Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
273
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were
slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also prefer
able in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar
detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size
and internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section
than the Lockheed A-12. 15
Comparison of Lockheed and
Convair Designs
Lockheed A-12
Speed
Range (total)
Range (at altitude)
Cruising Altitude
Start
Midrange
End
Cost summary (for 12
aircraft without engines)
Mach 3.2
4,120 nm
3,800 nm
84,500 ft.
91.000 ft.
97,600 ft.
$96.6 million
Convair KINGFISH
Mach 3.2
3,400 nm
3,400 nm
85.000 ft.
88.000 ft.
94,000 ft.
$ I 21.6 million
Some of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair
KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they
were eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air
Force members of the panel, who believed that Convair's cost over
runs and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in
this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under
budget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security.
Lockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the
Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared
by the Agency.
Despite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection
panel remained concerned about the A-12 's vulnerability to radar de
tection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for
reducing the A-l2's radar cross section by l January 1960. On 14
September 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed
" OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 18-19 (TS Codeword).
Secret

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.