Documents / Official release
CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974
Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Nevers”34 pages
- p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have
become known. The assistance…
- p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been
a formal decision as such. In…
- p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve
problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the
need…
- p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti
tudes never before attained in sustained…
- p. 102 …put aside for further thought
(which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
- p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
- p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet
airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
- p. 159 …Six of the men on board were
killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
- p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening
as the blockade of l 948…
- p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig
inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10"
Detachment…
- p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into
the mission, an SA…
- p. 194 …program in I 974, but
RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
- p. 208 …very
good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because
satellite photography gradually began…
- p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l
May 1960 proved to be the…
- p. 223 …Responsibility for photo
graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots
never…
- p. 227 …Both were expe
rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the
rebels…
- p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had
more than three U-2s…
- p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac
cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
- p. 264 251
Seu et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
- p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated
vertical stabii izers."
THE OXCART…
- p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be
fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
- p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was
never used in a Navy aircraft.
"OSA History. chap…
- p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem
that would never be solved…
- p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels
never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
- p. 313 …even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to…
- p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
lockon modes, a fact that…
- p. 317 …strongly opposed it
and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President
Johnson. 5" The…
- p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain,
taxied to the runway and took off…
- p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
- p. 328 …the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
- p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of
this aircraft also led to…
- p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF
recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used
and was transferred to…
- p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never
took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
- p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop
ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
273
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 6
characteristics, although the Lockheed design's specifications were
slightly better in each category. The Lockheed design was also prefer
able in terms of overall cost. In the vital area of vulnerability to radar
detection, however, the Convair design was superior. Its smaller size
and internally mounted engines gave it a smaller radar cross section
than the Lockheed A-12. 15
Comparison of Lockheed and
Convair Designs
Lockheed A-12
Speed
Range (total)
Range (at altitude)
Cruising Altitude
Start
Midrange
End
Cost summary (for 12
aircraft without engines)
Mach 3.2
4,120 nm
3,800 nm
84,500 ft.
91.000 ft.
97,600 ft.
$96.6 million
Convair KINGFISH
Mach 3.2
3,400 nm
3,400 nm
85.000 ft.
88.000 ft.
94,000 ft.
$ I 21.6 million
Some of the CIA representatives initially favored the Convair
KINGFISH design because of its smaller radar cross section, but they
were eventually convinced to support the Lockheed design by the Air
Force members of the panel, who believed that Convair's cost over
runs and production delays on the B-58 project might be repeated in
this new project. In contrast, Lockheed had produced the U-2 under
budget and on time. Another factor favoring the A-12 was security.
Lockheed had experience in running a highly secure facility (the
Skunk Works) in which all of the key employees were already cleared
by the Agency.
Despite its vote in favor of the Lockheed proposal, the selection
panel remained concerned about the A-12 's vulnerability to radar de
tection and therefore required Lockheed to prove its concept for
reducing the A-l2's radar cross section by l January 1960. On 14
September 1959, the CIA awarded a four-month contract to Lockheed
" OSA History, chap. 20, pp. 18-19 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.