Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 22 …11 Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- •ify" the B-57 and…
  • p. 54 …the DCI Jfor Planning and Coordination I Headquarters CIA USAF -125 I I I Foreign…
  • p. 55 …total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test ing faci lity. and three…
  • p. 56 …until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1962. The final…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …later and promptly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call reached…
  • p. 153 …project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not a satisfactory location for overflights of…
  • p. 168 …110 In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came to project headquarters for an…
  • p. 191 …commander at Adana, co Air Force Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 235 …the pilot reported the incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con tacted the Pennsylvania…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …been deployed in North Vietnam.61 Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con firmed this decision on 21 May."9 - - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
270
Secret NOfiOftN
Chapter 6
designs and continued the competition. Lockheed continued to work
on developing a design that would be less vulnerable to detection, and
Convair received a new C[A contract to design an air-breathing
twin-engine aircraft that would meet the general specifications being
d 11
followed by Lockhee .
Following recommendations by the Land committee, both
Lockheed and Convair incorporated the Pratt & Whitney 158 power
plant into their designs. This engine had originally been developed
for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the Glenn L. Martin
Company's P6M Seamaster, and was the most powerful engine
available. [n 1958 the Navy had canceled the Seamaster program,
which had left Pratt & Whitney without a buyer for the powerful 158
• I~
engine.
Although the Land committee had not yet found an acceptable
design, it informed President Eisenhower on 20 July 1959 that the
search was making good progress. Concerned about the U-2's vulner
ability to detection and possible interception and aware that the
photosatellite project was encountering significant problems, the
President gave his final approval to the high-speed reconnaissance
aircraft project. 13
THE SELECTION OF THE LOCKHEED DESIGN
By the late summer of 1959, both Convair and Lockheed had com
pleted new designs for a follow-on to the U-2. Convair's entry, known
as the KINGFISH, used much of the technology developed for the
F-102, F-106, and B-58, including stainless steel honeycomb skin,
planiform wing design, and a crew capsule escape system, which
eliminated the need for the pilot to wear a pressurized suit. The
KfNGFISH had two side-by-side 158 engines inside the fuselage,
which significantly reduced the radar cross section. Two additional
" OSA History, chap. 20, p. I 5 (TS Codeword).
"Cunningham interview, 4 October 1983 (TS Codeword); Joseph V. Charyk. interview
by Donald E. We[zenbach. tape recording. Washington. DC, 5 December 1984 (TS
Codeword).
"Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Memorandum of Conference with the President," 20 July [959.
WHOSS. ALPHA. DDEL (TS).
Secret

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.