Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 19 …staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 Seeret
  • p. 36 …In 1952 the Royal Air Force (RAF) began Project ROBIN, which was designed to modify the…
  • p. 106 …The U-2s were to use Lakenheath AFB, an RAF base also used by the USAF…
  • p. 107 …penetrated the British radar net work, causing RAF fighters to scramble. Afterward the Air Ministry made…
  • p. 122 …twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin Yar in 1953. The US…
  • p. 156 …Range for the first time since the RAF's overflight in 1953, obtaining photographs of a…
  • p. 166 …In November 1958, four RAF officers arrived at Detachment B at Adana. thus beginning the United…
  • p. 167 …ask Air Vice Marshal MacDonald if the RAF was prepared to '"" See, for ex:ample, the…
  • p. 168 …MacDonald agreed to Bissell's proposal and began recruiting RAF pilots to fly the U-2…
  • p. 169 …Most flights by the RAF pilots in Detachment B, however, took place in the Middle East…
  • p. 177 …For almost a year, the RAF pilots of Detachment B had been ready to fly over…
  • p. 194 …A four-man unit of RAF U-2 pilots was stationed at Detachment G, Edwards AFB…
  • p. 200 …approval authority for missions conducted by the RAF pilots in Detachment 8. The loss of Powers…
  • p. 316 …Project IDEALIST U-2 flying from an RAF facility in Great Britain. The OXCART would fly…
  • p. 332 …1960, the need for British participation lessened. RAF pilots henceforth flew only training or ferry missions…
  • p. 339 …P-E PFIAB PI PIC PID PSAC RAF RFP SAB SAC SAC SA/PC/DCI SAM…
  • p. 351 …4154 Powers Peshawar B B Tyuratam, Kyshtym, Sverdlovsk; downed by SAM a RAF pilot Sec1 et
  • p. 402 …Louis 29 Watertown Strip 57 Watton RAF Base. England 156 "weather plane" cover story 179 weather…
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~,et NOFOAN
Chapter 6
to be ignited. Since ramjet engines had only been tested in wind tun
nels, there was no available data to prove that these engines would
work in the application proposed by Convair. The second uncertain
factor was the B-58B bomber that was supposed to achieve Mach 2.2
before launching the FISH above 35 ,000 feet. This version of the
B-58 was still in the design stage.
Convair's proposal suffered a major setback in June 1959, when
the Air Force canceled the 8-58B project. Conversion of the older,
slower B-58A into a supersonic launching platform for the FISH was
ruled out by the high cost and technical difficulties invol ved.
Moreover, the Air Force was unwilling to part with two aircraft from
the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588
program not been canceled, however, the FISH proposal would proba
bly not have been feasible. Convair engineers had calculated that the
added weight of the FISH would prevent the B-588 from achieving
the speed required to ignite the parasite aircraft's ramjet engines.
The Convai r proposal was therefore unusable, but the Lockheed
design with its high radar cross section was also unacceptable to the
Land committee. On 14 July 1959, the committee rejected both
Lockheed A · 11
Sec,et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.