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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
268
Secret NOFOAN
Chapter 6
Rodgers determined that a high-altitude object moving two to
three times as fast as a normal aircraft would produce such a small
blip with so little persistence that the radar operator would have great
difficulty tracking it, if indeed he could even see it. Rodgers esti
mated that for an aircraft to take advantage o!· this Blip/Scan Ratio
phenomenon it must fly at altitudes approaching 90,000 feet and have
a radar cross section of less than 10 square meters, preferably not
much over 5 square meters. However, for a Mach 3.0 aircraft to
achieve such a small radar cross section, its designers would have to
make many concessions in its structural design and aerodynamics.•
By the summer of 1959, both firms had completed their propos
als. In early June, Lockheed submitted a design for a ground-launched
aircraft known as the A-11. It would have a speed of Mach 3.2, a
range of 3,200 miles, an altitude of 90,000 feet, and a completion date
of January 1961. Kelly Johnson had refused to reduce the aerodynam
ics of his design in order to achieve a greater antiradar capability, and
the A-11 's radar cross section, although not great, was substantially
larger than that of the much smaller parasite aircraft being designed
by Convair."
The Convair proposal called for a small, manned, ramjet-pow
ered, reconnaissance vehicle to be air launched from one of two spe
cially configured Convair B-58B Super Hustlers. The FISH vehicle, a
radical lifting body with a very-small-radar cross section, would fly at
Mach 4.2 at 90.000 feet and have a range of 3,900 miles. Two
Marquardt ramjets would power its Mach 4.2 dash over the target
area. Once the FISH decelerated, two Pratt & Whitney JT-12 turbojets
would bring it back to base. The ramjet exit nozzles and wing edges
would be constructed of Pyroceram, a ceramic material that could
withstand the high temperatures of very high speeds and would ab
sorb radiofrequency energy from radar pulses. Convair stated that the
FISH could be ready by January I 961."'
Convair's proposal depended on two uncertain factors. First and
foremost was the unproven technology of ramjet engines. At the time,
no aircraft in existence could carry a large, ramjet-powered craft into
the sky and then accelerate to sufficient speed for the ramjet engines
'Unnumbered Convair document on the Blip/Scan Ratio or Rodgers· Effect (TS).
,, Johnson, "Archangel log." Dt:l:ember 1958-July 1959.
'" OSA History. chap. 20. p. 12 (TS Codeword); Convair Division. General Dynamics
Corporation, "Pniject FISH Status Review," 9 June 1959 (S).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.