Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 11 …At great risk, US Air Force and Navy aircraft had been conducting peripheral reconnaissance and shallow…
  • p. 16 …As a result, in the late 1940s, the US Air Force and Navy began trying to…
  • p. 17 …Two months later, on 7 October 1952, Soviet fighter aircraft stalked and shot down a US…
  • p. 72 …The terminology used to describe U-2 aircraft and pilots also played a part in maintaining…
  • p. 94 …The committee issued its l ist of cargets for the use of the entire intelli gence…
  • p. 147 …The Agency then turned co the Navy, which granted permission for Detachmernt C to use the…
  • p. 180 …James Doolittle urged President Eisenhower to use overflights of the Soviet Union to the maximum degree…
  • p. 223 …by Air Force and Navy reconnais sance aircraft. President Kennedy used NPIC photographs to i llustrate…
  • p. 273 …Charyk, and his Navy counterpart, Garrison Norton. Designers from several air craft manufacturers also attended some…
  • p. 283 …This engine had originally been developed for the Navy's large, jet-powered flying boat, the…
  • p. 297 …The need for additional bui ldings on the base was met by the Navy. Three surplus…
  • p. 298 …After hearing Bissell and Holcomb's suggestion that the 158 might be used in future Navy…
  • p. 348 …Following modifications to make System-VII suitable for use by the Navy, the designation was changed…
  • p. 353 …In 1968 tests on an AQUILINE prototype at Randsburg Wash on the US Navy's Naval…
  • p. 401 …247, 328 US Marine Corps Reserve 14 US Military Academy at West Point 329 US Navy…
267
Secret NOF'OFU~
Chapter 6
Although President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this
type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had
been tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the mat
ter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that
CIA, the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were
working on a funding plan for the project. The President suggested
that the Air Force "could support the project by transferring some re
connaissance money." At the close of the meeting, Eisenhower asked
the group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss
further stages of the project with him. 7
COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR
With funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available,
Richard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convair to submit detailed pro
posals. During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair
worked to reduce the radar cross section of their designs, with assis
tance from Franklin Rodgers of the Scientific Engineering Institute.
lri pursuing his antiradar studies, Rodgers had discovered a phenome
non that he believed could be used to advantage by the new recon
naissance aircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred to
as the Rodgers' Effect, this phenomenon involved three elements: the
strength of a radar return, the altitude of the object being illuminated
by the radar, and the persistence of the radar return on the radar
screen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).
Most tracking radars in the late 1950s swept a band of sky 30° to
45° wide and 360° in circumference. Any object encountered in this
area reflected the radar pulse in a manner directly proportional to its
size-the larger the object, the stronger the returning radar signal.
This return appeared on the cathode-ray tube of the radar screen as a
spot or blip, and the persistence of this blip on the radar screen also
depended on the strength of the radar return, with blips from larger
objects remaining on the screen longer. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, a human radar operator watched the radar screen and
kept track of the blips that indicated aircraft within the radar's field of
view.
'Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Memorandum of Conference with the President. 17 December
1958. 10:26 a.m.," 22 December 1958, WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.