Documents / Official release
CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974
Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Nevers”34 pages
- p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have
become known. The assistance…
- p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been
a formal decision as such. In…
- p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve
problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the
need…
- p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti
tudes never before attained in sustained…
- p. 102 …put aside for further thought
(which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
- p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never
entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
- p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet
airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
- p. 159 …Six of the men on board were
killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
- p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening
as the blockade of l 948…
- p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig
inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10"
Detachment…
- p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into
the mission, an SA…
- p. 194 …program in I 974, but
RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
- p. 208 …very
good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because
satellite photography gradually began…
- p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l
May 1960 proved to be the…
- p. 223 …Responsibility for photo
graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots
never…
- p. 227 …Both were expe
rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the
rebels…
- p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had
more than three U-2s…
- p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac
cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
- p. 264 251
Seu et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
- p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated
vertical stabii izers."
THE OXCART…
- p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be
fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
- p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was
never used in a Navy aircraft.
"OSA History. chap…
- p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem
that would never be solved…
- p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels
never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
- p. 313 …even
though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect.
Since U-2s continued to…
- p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and
lockon modes, a fact that…
- p. 317 …strongly opposed it
and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President
Johnson. 5" The…
- p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain,
taxied to the runway and took off…
- p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the
OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
- p. 328 …the President never went so far
as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
- p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of
this aircraft also led to…
- p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF
recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used
and was transferred to…
- p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never
took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
- p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop
ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
267
Secret NOF'OFU~
Chapter 6
Although President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this
type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had
been tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the mat
ter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that
CIA, the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were
working on a funding plan for the project. The President suggested
that the Air Force "could support the project by transferring some re
connaissance money." At the close of the meeting, Eisenhower asked
the group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss
further stages of the project with him. 7
COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR
With funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available,
Richard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convair to submit detailed pro
posals. During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair
worked to reduce the radar cross section of their designs, with assis
tance from Franklin Rodgers of the Scientific Engineering Institute.
lri pursuing his antiradar studies, Rodgers had discovered a phenome
non that he believed could be used to advantage by the new recon
naissance aircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred to
as the Rodgers' Effect, this phenomenon involved three elements: the
strength of a radar return, the altitude of the object being illuminated
by the radar, and the persistence of the radar return on the radar
screen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).
Most tracking radars in the late 1950s swept a band of sky 30° to
45° wide and 360° in circumference. Any object encountered in this
area reflected the radar pulse in a manner directly proportional to its
size-the larger the object, the stronger the returning radar signal.
This return appeared on the cathode-ray tube of the radar screen as a
spot or blip, and the persistence of this blip on the radar screen also
depended on the strength of the radar return, with blips from larger
objects remaining on the screen longer. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, a human radar operator watched the radar screen and
kept track of the blips that indicated aircraft within the radar's field of
view.
'Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Memorandum of Conference with the President. 17 December
1958. 10:26 a.m.," 22 December 1958, WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.