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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 5 …139 Cooperation With Norway ....................................................................... 142 Declining Overflight Activity.................................................................... 143 Concerns About Soviet Countermeasures Against the U…
  • p. 7 …320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance Program o n the…
  • p. 91 …Early in the program Bissell and Ritland had foreseen such an emergency and, with the cooperation…
  • p. 95 …their awareness of the vital nature of their mission kept the level of cooperation high. The…
  • p. 143 …deception project since its early days, he cooperated reluctantly because he disliked adding attachments that made…
  • p. 155 …the beginning of cooperation between CIA and the Norwegian Intelligence Service on the U-2 program…
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 169 …a logical ex tension of the close cooperation that already existed between the two countries on…
  • p. 196 …as possible while giving the appearance of cooperating with his cap tors. To extract the maximum…
  • p. 287 …by Edgerton, Germeshausen & Grier (EG&G) in cooperation with the Scientific Engineering Institute at a small…
  • p. 302 …Halaby cooperated fully with the Agency and personally briefed all FAA regional chiefs on how to…
  • p. 334 …The cooperation between the Agency and the Air Force that began with the U-2 and…
267
Secret NOF'OFU~
Chapter 6
Although President Eisenhower supported the purchase of this
type of aircraft, he questioned the plan to procure any before they had
been tested. Promising that more thought would be given to the mat
ter before such an order was placed, Secretary Quarles noted that
CIA, the Defense Department, and the Bureau of the Budget were
working on a funding plan for the project. The President suggested
that the Air Force "could support the project by transferring some re
connaissance money." At the close of the meeting, Eisenhower asked
the group to return after completing the next work phase to discuss
further stages of the project with him. 7
COMPETITION BETWEEN LOCKHEED AND CONVAIR
With funding for the proposed new type of aircraft now available,
Richard Bissell asked Lockheed and Convair to submit detailed pro
posals. During the first half of 1959, both Lockheed and Convair
worked to reduce the radar cross section of their designs, with assis
tance from Franklin Rodgers of the Scientific Engineering Institute.
lri pursuing his antiradar studies, Rodgers had discovered a phenome
non that he believed could be used to advantage by the new recon
naissance aircraft. Known as the Blip/Scan Ratio but also referred to
as the Rodgers' Effect, this phenomenon involved three elements: the
strength of a radar return, the altitude of the object being illuminated
by the radar, and the persistence of the radar return on the radar
screen (Pulse-Position Indicator display).
Most tracking radars in the late 1950s swept a band of sky 30° to
45° wide and 360° in circumference. Any object encountered in this
area reflected the radar pulse in a manner directly proportional to its
size-the larger the object, the stronger the returning radar signal.
This return appeared on the cathode-ray tube of the radar screen as a
spot or blip, and the persistence of this blip on the radar screen also
depended on the strength of the radar return, with blips from larger
objects remaining on the screen longer. During the late 1950s and
early 1960s, a human radar operator watched the radar screen and
kept track of the blips that indicated aircraft within the radar's field of
view.
'Andrew J. Goodpaster. "Memorandum of Conference with the President. 17 December
1958. 10:26 a.m.," 22 December 1958, WHOSS, Alpha. DDEL (TS).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.