Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
Set1 el NOP'OAN
Chapter 1
15
mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . ... The prototype of this
plane can be produced within a year from the date of order: Five
planes could be delivered for operations within two years..
The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor
mal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget
is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282. :;
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false
impression that most A ir Force officials supported the Lockhee:d de
sign. (n reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro
cess of choosing the modified version of the Mart in B-57 and the new
Bell X- 16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.
During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick
Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282
because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and
because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might
make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked
S.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong
promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hi red
Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell .
Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:"'
Philip Strong
Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be
fore he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud
ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then
completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at
Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During
World War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive
officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. A fter the war,
he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 until the
end of 195 1, when he became a staff member of the Ford
Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953,
when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United
'·' Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo
Reconnaissance," 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl.
'' Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science
and Technology Historical Series OSI- I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS
Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.