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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
Set1 el NOP'OAN
Chapter 1
15
mainly with XF-104 jigs and designs . ... The prototype of this
plane can be produced within a year from the date of order: Five
planes could be delivered for operations within two years..
The Bell proposal is a more conventional aircrai having nor
mal landing gear. As a result, its maximum altiwde over .rarget
is 69,500 feet and the speed and range are not as good as the
Lockheed CL-282. :;
Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL-282 had given Strong the false
impression that most A ir Force officials supported the Lockhee:d de
sign. (n reality, the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy was in the pro
cess of choosing the modified version of the Mart in B-57 and the new
Bell X- 16 to meet future reconnaissance needs.
During their meeting with Strong, Trevor Gardner, Fredlerick
Ayer, and Garrison Norton explained that they favored the CL-282
because it gave promise of flying higher than the other designs and
because at maximum altitude its smaller radar cross section might
make it invisible to existing Soviet radars. The three officials :asked
S.trong if the CIA would be interested in such an aircraft. Strong
promised to talk to the Director of Central Intelligence's newly hi red
Special Assistant for Planning and Coordination. Richard M. Bissell .
Jr., about possible Agency interest in the CL-282.:"'
Philip Strong
Richard Bissell had already had an active and varied career be
fore he joi ned the CIA. A graduate of Groton and Yale, Bissell stud
ied at the London School of Economics for a year and then
completed a doctorate at Yale in 1939. He taught economics, first at
Yale and then from 1942 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), where he became a full professor in 1948. During
World War II. Bissell had managed American shipping as executive
officer of the Combined Shipping Adjustment Board. A fter the war,
he served as deputy director of the Marshall Plan from 1948 until the
end of 195 1, when he became a staff member of the Ford
Foundation. His first association with the Agency came in late 1953,
when he undertook a contract study of possible responses the United
'·' Philip G. Strong. Memorandum for the Record . ..Special Aircraft for Penetr:nion Photo
Reconnaissance," 12 May 1954. OSI records (now in OSWR). job 80R-0l424. box I (Sl.
'' Karl H. Weber. The Office of Scientific /r11elligence. /949-68. Directorate of Science
and Technology Historical Series OSI- I (CIA: DS&T. I 971). vol. I. tab A. pp. 16- 17 (TS
Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.