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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
263
See, et NOFORN
Chapter 6
Lockheed design for a hydrogen-powered aircraft (the CL-400). The
committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this
meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with a very-low-radar cross sec
tion (the G2A) and a new supersonic design (the A-2)-and did not
accept either one, the former because of its slow speed and the latter
because of its dependence on exotic fuels for its ramjets and its over
all high cost. The committee approved the continuation of Convair's
work on a ramjet-powered Mach 4.0 "parasite" aircraft that would be
launched from a specially configured version of the B-58B bomber.
The design was termed a parasite because it could not take off on its
own but needed a larger aircraft to carry it aloft and accelerate it to
the speed required to start the ramjet engine. The Convair design was
called the FISH.5
Two months later, after reviewing the Convair proposal and yet
another Lockheed design for a high-speed reconnaissance aircraft (the
A-3), the Land committee concluded in late November 1958 that it
would indeed be feasible to build an aircraft whose speed and altitude
would make radar tracking difficult or impossible. The committee,
therefore, recommended that DCI Dulles ask President Eisenhower to
- ~ approve further pursuit of the project and to provide funds for addi
tional studies and tests.6
On 17 December 1958, Allen Dulles and Richard Bissell briefed
the President on the progress toward a successor to the U-2. Also
present were Land and Purcell from the advisory committee,
Presidential Science Adviser James Killian, and Air Force Secretary
Donald Quarles. DCI Dulles reviewed the results of the U-2 missions
to date and stated his belief that a successor to the U-2 could be used
all over the world and "would have a much greater invulnerability to
detection."
Bissell then described the two competing projects by Lockheed
and Convair, noting that the chief question at the moment was
whether to use air launch or ground takeoff. The next phase, he add
ed, would be detailed engineering, at the end of which it was pro
posed that 12 aircraft be ordered at a cost of about $100 million.
'OSA History, chap. 20, p. 8 (TS Codeword); Johnson. "Archangel log." 17-24
September 1958.
• OSA Chronology. p. 21 (TS Codeword); Minnich, "OXCART Story," p. 3 (S); OSA
History. chap. 20. p. 8 (TS Codeword); Johnson, "Archangel log," 12 November 1958.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.