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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
257
lead to the overseas deployment of Detachment G U-2s in 1974, when
the CIA was tasked to monitor the Israeli-Egyptian and lateir the
Israeli-Syrian disengagement areas. On 21 April l 974, a Detachment
G U-2 with appropriate support elements arrived at Akrotiri, Cyprus,
to conduct Operation OLIVE HARVEST. Between l2 May and 28
July, the detachment conducted six overfli ghts of the disengagement
areas. During these missions the electronic warning systems of the
U-2 registered numerous radar lockons, but no surface-to-air mis:siles
were fired. On l August 1974, responsibility for the OUYE
HARVEST missions as well as the aircraft itself came into the hands
of the Air Force as part of the transfer of the entire Agency U-2 pro
gram at that time. 77
The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities
The Agency's U-2 program had been under review since the autumn
of l 969 to detennine if it should be continued along with the larger
Air Force U-2 program. In December 1969, President Nixon decided
to keep the Agency's program in existence through l 971 and asked
for a formal review by the 40 Committee (the new name for the 303
·Committee/Special Group). ln August 1970, the committee recom
mended continuing the program through fiscal year 1972. On 12
August 1972, the 40 Committee again favored continuation of the
CIA U-2 program. This recommendation was motivated primarily by
a desire not to alienate the Nationalist Chinese Government by el.imi
nating Project TACKLE. In June 1973, however, DCI Jame:s R.
Schlesinger informed the 40 Committee that this project could be ter
minated without causing major difficulties with the Nationalist
Chinese. On 30 August 1973, the 40 Committee approved the C:IA's
plans to tenninate the U-2 program effective I August 1974. The: Air
Force would assume funding responsibility for the four U-2R airicraft
assigned to the Agency and would take physical possession of them
then or shortly thereafter. On l April l 974, Ambassador Walter P.
McConaughy informed the Nationalist Chinese Government of the
US intention to end the U-2 project, and the two countries then
worked out a schedule for phasing out Project TACKLE.73
The transfer of all Agency U-2s to the Air Force eliminated
Detachments G and H. Their parent organization, the Office of
Special Activities, began its phaseout immediately thereafter. The
20-year career of the U-2 with the CIA had come to an end.
,., Ibid.. pp. 31-H (TS Codeword).
,. Ibid.. chap. 10, pp. 1-4 (TS Codeword).
Secret NOfOftN
Chapter 5

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.