Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 12 later, at press conferences in February and July 1. 964, President Lyndon B. Johnson revealed the…
  • p. 40 …and meetings with every major unit of the US defense and intelligence establish ments. After receiving…
  • p. 98 …The Soviet Union sent strongly worded protest notes to the United States and the nations from…
  • p. 102 …not only press releases and the public Line to be taken, but also the suspension of…
  • p. 107 …in the United Kingdom. At about the ' Ibid.. pp. 17-18 (TS Codeword). ' Press Release of…
  • p. 112 …at a press conference that the Soviet Union might be ahead of the United States in…
  • p. 125 …Dial Press. 1982), pp. 45-47. '' Lundahl and Brugioni interview (TS Codeword). ~eeret
  • p. 167 …By 1957 cooperation be tween the United Kingdom and the United States had expanded to include…
  • p. 174 …Defense Department officials pressed President Eisenhower to authorize renewed overflights to gather up-to-date in…
  • p. 183 …On the 9 April overflight, the U-2 's ELINT-collection unit (System VI) indicated Soviet…
  • p. 195 …in the press about the presence of "spyplanes" on Japanese territory, asked the United States to…
  • p. 198 …DCI records (S). " United States Congress. Senate. Foreign Relations Committee. £recutive Sessions of tlze Sencae Foreign…
  • p. 307 …By 1962 the United States had become aware of the effectiveness of a new Soviet radar…
  • p. 315 …To preserve the secrecy of the OXCART program, the Air Force informed the press that an…
  • p. 328 …at times when the press and Congress alleged that the United States was falling behind the…
  • p. 362 …Smithsonian Institute Press, l 985. Khrushchev. Nikita S. Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament. Boston: Little, Brown…
  • p. 401 …United Kingdom (See Great Britain) United Kingdom Requirements Committee 154 United Nations 20 United Press International…
14
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 1
Trevor Gardner
design showed the most promise for reconnaissance of the Soviet
Union. This belief was shared by Gardner's special assistant,
Frederick Ayer, Jr., and Garrison Norton. an adviser to Secretary
Talbott.~'
According to Norton, Gardner tried to interest SAC commander
LeMay in the Lockheed aircraft because Gardner envisioned it pri
marily as a collector of strategic. rather than tactical. intell igence. But
General LeMay had already show ni that he was not interested in an
unarmed aircraft. Gardner, Ayer, and Norton then decided to seek CIA
support for the high-flying aircraft. At that rime the Agency·s official
involvement in overhead reconnaissance was limited to advising the
Air Force on the problems of launiching large camera-carryi ng bal
loons for reconnaissance flights· over hostile territory (for the details
of this program. see chapter 2). The Chief of the Operations Staff in
the Office of Scientific Intelligence, Philip G. Strong. however.
served on several Air Force advisory boards and kept himself well in
formed on developments in reconnaissance aircraft.!!
Gardner, Norton, and Ayer met with Strong in the Pentagon on
12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve lopment Command
began to evaluate the Lockheed proposal. Gardner described Kelly
Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this
meeting. Strong summarized his impressions of the Air Force·s search
for a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft:
Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re
ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild. and Bell. ...
The Lockheed proposal is considered to be the best. It has been
given the type designation of CL-282 and in many respects is a
jet-powered glider based essentially on the Lockheed Day
Fighter XF-104. It is primarily subsonic but can attain transonic
speeds over the target with a consequent loss of range. With an
altitude of 73,000 feet over the target it has a combat radius of
1,400 nautical miles. ... The CL-282 can be manufactured
" Garrison Norton. interview by Donald E. Wt!lzcnbach. tape recording. Wa.shington. DC.
23 May 1983 (S): Michael R. Beschloss. Mayd"y: Eisenhower. Kltrmhchev and the U-2
Affuir (New York: Harper & Row. 1986). p. 79.
" Strong was a colonel in the Marine Corps Reserve and often used that tille even though
he was not on active duty. He later ad,·anced to• the rank or brigadier general in the reserve.
For S1rong·.~ contacts with senior Air Force officials concerning 1he CL-282. see the
Norton interview (S).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.