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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
251
Seu et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an aircraft
carrier. Although the idea of using a floating airbase to avoid political
sensitivity proved feasible, the cost did not. Aircraft carriers are enor
mously expensive to operate and require an entire flotilla of vessels to
protect and service them. The movement of large numbers of big
ships is difficult to conceal and cannot be hastily accomplished, while
the deployment of a solitary U-2 to a remote airfield can take place
overnight.
A New Version of the U-2
By the summer of 1966, the number of flyable Agency U-2s had
dwindled to six-two at Detachment H in Taiwan and four at
Detachment G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo
ing repair. The Agency had originally ordered 20 U-2s in 1954-55
(the Air Force had purchased another 31 of these planes), and Kelly
Johnson's crew at the Skunk Works had managed to assemble four
additional craft for the Agency from leftover spare parts and usable
sections of crashed aircraft. This brought the total number of U-2s ac
quired by the Agency to 24, for an average cost of $812.500 each.
At this point, the DCI and the Secretary of Defense on I August
1966 decided to place an order with Lockheed for eight more aircraft
to be used in the Agency and Air Force U-2 programs-a completely
new version of the aircraft. Kelly Johnson had been working on ways
to improve the performance of the U-2 since early I 965 because he
was concerned that all the modifications and additions to the aircraft
over the years had made it so heavy that it had lost almost half of its
range and several thousand feet in cruising altitude.11 The new model,
known as the U-2R, had a longer fuselage and a wider wingspan than
the original U-2. The U-2R's wings were 103 feet long with 1,000
square feet of lifting surface, in contrast to the U-2C's 80-foot wings
with only 600 square feet. The longer fuselage of the U-2R made it
possible to provide two pressurized bays with an additional 2.2 cubic
meters of equipment space and also achieve a better weight distribu
tion. The net result of all these improvements was a much better per
forming aircraft. No longer did the U-2 pilot have to worry about
keeping the aircraft's speed at altitude within a 6-knot window in the
stall/buffet corner of the flight envelope. The envelope was now ex
tended to 20 knots, which greatly improved flyability.
" Johnson, "Log for Projc::ct X," 2 F.:bruary 1965. June: to Octobc::r 1965. 20 Octobc::r
1965: Johnson, "U-2R Log," January to August 1966.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.