Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 22 …11 Air Force headquarters soon approved Martin's proposal to mod- •ify" the B-57 and…
  • p. 54 …the DCI Jfor Planning and Coordination I Headquarters CIA USAF -125 I I I Foreign…
  • p. 55 …total of 357 personnel divided among project headquarters, a US test ing faci lity. and three…
  • p. 56 …until it moved into the new CIA Headquarters building at Langley in March 1962. The final…
  • p. 73 …On 3 August 1955, Dulles and Twining met at SAC headquarters in Omaha to sign the…
  • p. 102 …U-2 project officer, the Air Force Headquarters project officer, and NACA's top official, Dr…
  • p. 107 …did not have to report to higher headquarters. WRSP-1, known within the Agency as Detachment…
  • p. 117 …Late on the evening of 3 July, Bissell went to project headquarters in the Matomic Building…
  • p. 127 …The PARAMOUNT Committee worked inside PID headquarters in the Steuart Building. Composed of members from CIA…
  • p. 138 …later and promptly reported the conversation to headquarters. When details of Vito's close call reached…
  • p. 153 …project headquarters had already decided that Western Europe was not a satisfactory location for overflights of…
  • p. 168 …110 In June 1958, representatives from the British Air Ministry came to project headquarters for an…
  • p. 191 …commander at Adana, co Air Force Europe headquarters. and co the Chief of Station at Ankara…
  • p. 194 …Because the new government had not been briefed on the U-2, Project Headquarters refused to…
  • p. 205 …its own building to the new CIA Headquarters at Langley. Soon afterward. Col. Stanley W. Beerli…
  • p. 235 …the pilot reported the incident to Headquarters. The Office of Security immediately con tacted the Pennsylvania…
  • p. 312 …that the performance of an A-12 with J75 engines (as suggested by project headquarters for…
  • p. 319 …been deployed in North Vietnam.61 Project Headquarters in Langley planned and directed all operational BLACK…
  • p. 323 …Project headquarters informed Deputy Defense Secretary Vance on lO January I 967 that the A- l…
  • p. 324 …President Johnson con firmed this decision on 21 May."9 - - - Project headquarters selected 8 June 1968…
  • p. 334 …Air Force personnel served at all levels of the recon naissance program, from project headquarters to…
  • p. 365 …Speech given by Richard Bissell at CIA Headquarters, 12 October 1965 (Top Secret Codeword). Interview with…
247
Chapter 5
Vietnam in January 1973, US mi litary flights in the area were forbid
den. The Nixon administration, therefore, tasked the CIA with moni
toring North Vietnam's compliance with the cease-fire accords.
The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover
of Lockheed employees working on a government contract to check
weather conditions. Their high ly sensitive missions had to remain at
least 15 nautical miles away from the North Vietnamese coast, and
they initially flew at low altitude in a deceptive direction in order to
avoid PRC radars. These constraints made the missions diffic
ult because at low altitude the U-2 consumed more fuel and encoun
tered more turbulence and the pilocs· pressure suits tended to
overheat.
The first mission on 30 March 1973 was only marginally suc
cessful because of cloud cover and haze, which prevented it from
photographing most of its targets. A second mission on the following
day had somewhat better luck with the weather. but problems with the
film processing reduced the mission ·s coverage. Afterward, the mon
soon season prevented any further missions until 21 July 1973. This
·mission obtained usable photography of SAM sites and North
Vietnamese supply operations, although the resolution was not as
high as it should have been because the H camera lens had not been
properly focused. The last SCOPE SHIELD mission, on 6 January
1974. finally succeeded in obtaining high-quality photography. The
mission provided complete coverage of shipping in Haiphong Harbor.
SAM defenses, and North Vietnamese naval order of battle.M
IMPROVEMENTS IN U-2 TECHNOLOGY
Modification of U-2s for Aircraft Carrier Deployment
In mid-1963 , the Office of Special Activities set in motion Project
WHALE TALE to examine the possibi lity of adapting the U-2 aircraft
for operations from an aircraft carrier. In the past, protest notes from
the Soviet Union to Turkey and Pakistan and from Communist China
to India had been responsible for interrupting overflight operations.
CIA planners believed that. if U-2s could be modified to operate from
aircraft carriers, the United States could avoid the political problems
~ Ibid .. pp. 48-51 (TS Codeword).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.