Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“The Advance”34 pages
13 Sect et NOFORN Chapter 1 World War II in multiengine bombers. In addition, aerial photography experts in the late 1940s and early 1950s emphasized focal length as the primary factor in reconnaissance photography and, therefore, pre ferred large aircraft capable of accommodating long focal-length cameras. This preference reached an extreme in the early 1950s with the development of the cumbersome 240-inch Boston camera, a de vice so large that the YC-97 Boeing Stratocruiser that carried it had to be partially disassembled before the camera could be installed. Finally, there was the feeling shared by many Air Force officers that two engines are always better than one because, if one fails, there is a spare to get the aircraft back to base. In reality, however, aviation re cords show that single-engine aircraft have always been more reliable than multiengine planes. Furthermore, a high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft deep in enemy territory would have little chance of returning if one of the engines failed, forcing the aircraft to descend. 19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the CL-282 proposal because it had only one engine and was too unusual and because the Air Force was already commit- ted to the modification of the Martin B-57.w By this time, the Air Force had also selected the Bell X-16; the formal contract calling for 28 aircraft was signed in September. Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the CL-282 and began seeking new sources of support for the aircraft. Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA Although the Air Force's uniformed hierarchy had decided in favor of the Bell and Martin aircraft, some high-level civilian officials contin ued to favor the Lockheed design. The most prominent proponent of the Lockheed proposal was Trevor Gardner, Special Assistant for Research and Development to Air Force Secretary Harold E. Talbott. Gardner had many contacts in west coast aeronautical circles because before coming to Washington he had headed the Hycon Manufacturing Company, which made aerial cameras in Pasadena, California. He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon in early April 1954 and believed that this '" Allen F. Donovan, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Corona del Mar, California, 20 May 1985 (S). '" Johnson, "Log for Project X," 7 June 1954. iaaret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.