CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

243
week later the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese launched their Tet of
fensive in South Vietnam. The 303 Committee (the new name for the
Special Group after 1964) decided on l February 1968 to suspend a
group of overflights scheduled for February and called for mis
sion-by-mission approval "during this period of tension." The com
mittee approved one additional overflight of southern China, which
was flown by Detachment H on 16 March 1968, and two overflights
of Cambodia, carried out on 27 March and 3 April 1968 by
Detachment G in its first operations since early 1966. These three
missions turned out to be the last overflights by U-2s in the Far East.
By this time U-2 flights over the PRC had become so dangerous that
the State Department opposed further overflights, and on l O April
1968 the 303 Committee decided not to approve any mission that
would fly closer than 20 miles from the coast of China.
One reason why Detachment H's overflights were stopped was
the steady increase in the PRC's ability to track and engage U-2s, as
evidenced by its success in downing five U-2s. By 1968 PRC radars
along the coast opposite Taiwan were keeping a close watch on U-2
activity from the T'ao-yuan base and actively tracked U-2s as soon as
they became airborne. The U-2s then had to face a growing PRC air
defense system that not only consisted of SA-2 missiles but also the
fast and high~flying MiG-21. The PRC's MiG-21 pilots had become
adept at the power-zoom technique and were threatening almost every
U-2 mission. The risks to U-2s now seemed too great.65
The decision to end Asian overflights was also rooted in the
Johnson administration's change in its whole approach to the war in
Indochina in the spring of 1968. On 31 March 1968, the President
limited the bombing of North Vietnam in order to improve the
chances for peace talks. The end of flights over the People's Republic
of China was viewed as another way to improve the peace process.
During its six years of overflight operations, Project TACKLE
had been extremely active, staging a total of 104 flights over the
People's Republic of China (see table, page 244). These missions had
brought back huge amounts of data about the PRC but not without a
price: five Project TACKLE aircraft had been downed by the PRC,
with two of the pilots killed and the other three captured (although
later returned). In addition, five other Nationalist Chinese pilots had
been killed in training accidents.
" OSA. "Chronology of Events Leading to Present Impasse on Resumption of TACKLE
Overflights of Mainland China." December 1968, OSA records (TS).
Sec, et NOFORl\,I
Chapter 5
6eeret