Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
238
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Chapter 5
ground force installations .. .would require about two man-years
work, backed up by a larger expansion of photointerpretation ef
fort.,, S3
Use of Infrared Scanner Over PRC Nuclear Plants
Photographic missions were not the only method used by the Agency
to gather information on the PRC's progress in developing nuclear
weapons. fn fact, standard overhead photography was of little value in
determining whether or not various nuclear-related facilities were
producing weapon-grade materials. Such information could onl1y be
obtained from agent reports or infrared imaging of the targets. which
would reveal the heat associated with nuclear-refining activity. Early
in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de
velop a high-resolution infrared scanner for the U-2 in order to ascer
tain the operntional status of Chinese nuclear reactors. After this
request was turned down. the Agency decided to fund the develop
ment of such a scanner itself. In the spring of 1963, the Office of
Research and Development (ORD) signed a contract with the Texas
Instruments C'Jmoration for the :roduction of an infrared scanner that
would operat ~----:---,.~-- ~ To conceal the intended
purpose of the scanner, the dev ices were called forest fire dete,ctors
and assigned model numbers such as "FFD-I ...
Tests conducted in Septe ~3 oro...-ed that model FFD-2
was ca • f reveal incr activit ·-------- -~~
I ~ Further im-
provements followed, and on 26 October 1964 ORUcleclarecl the
infrared unit operational. In reporting the successful results of the in
frared testing to DCI McCone. ORD Director Robert Chapman men
tioned that there was only one such unit in existence. McCone
immedi ately told Chapman to order more, and the Agency then pur
chased several for Project TACKLE and a stereo-configured FFD-4
for Project OXCART.
DC[ McCone reviewed these infrared detection developments
with Defense Secretary McNamara and his new deputy, Cyrus Vance,
on 30 October. being careful to point out that the new device was a
E..-ncv-snnnsored R&D because the Pentagon had ref~
'• ORR. M.:moran<lum tor tho: R.:cord. 11 January 1965, OSA records (TS Co<l.:wonJ).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.