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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
237
6ee1 el l\16t-OFU'\1
Chapter 5
Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H
Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued to grow,
spurred in part by the results of earlier U-2 missions that revealed the
presence of Soviet-made MiG-2ls in the PRC. In addition, there were
indications that Communist China might be producing its own SAMs.
Furthermore, satellite photography revealed that preparations for the
first Chinese nuclear test were almost complete at the Lop Nor test
site.
The need for photographs of the Lop Nor site was considered so
urgent that the Defense Department finally relented and permitted the
System-XIII false-angle device jammer to be installed in Project
TACKLE aircraft, with the proviso that it not be turned on until after
the pilot had been alerted by System-XII that he was being tracked by
FAN SONG radars. Photographing Lop Nor, however, was not a sim
ple task. Located more than 2,000 miles west-northwest of Taiwan,
Lop Nor lay beyond the round trip range of T'ao-yuan-based U-2s and
in-flight refueling was not possible. Lop Nor was closer to Ta Khli,
Thailand, only 1,650 miles northwest of that base, and much closer to
Charbatia, India, which lay only 1,200 miles south of the testing site.
After refusing DCI McCone's suggestion to stage a Lop Nor
overflight from Charbatia using a CIA civilian pilot, President
Johnson approved a proposal to send a Project TACKLE unit to Ta
Khli for the mission to Lop Nor. A Detachment H U-2 with a
Nationalist Chinese pilot deployed to Ta Khli in mid-October to pre
pare for the overflight. Before mission preparations could be complet
ed, however, the Chinese detonated their first nuclear weapon on 16
October 1964, and the mission was canceled.57
The first overflight of Communist China since the 7 July 1964
loss was a 31 October mission over Lan-chou. By mid-November,
three more overflights had taken place, one over North Korea and
northern China and two over southern and central China. An over
flight of Manchuria on 9 December 1964 brought back photos of a
G-class ballistic-missile submarine. By this time, the mass of data be
ing provided by Project TACKLE overflights was overwhelming the
analysts of the Office of Research and Reports (ORR). An ORR
memorandum from 11 January 1965 reported that analysis of the
"large backlog of unexploited photography on Chinese Communist
'' Lay, "USIB History," vol. 6, pp. 751. 753-755.
--6ec1er

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.