Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …This search soon led him to a British twin-engine medium bomber the Canberra-built by…
  • p. 19 …staff was the RB-57D in I 955, whose maximum altitude RAF Canberra Mark-PR3 Seeret
  • p. 22 …al titude performance of the 8-57 Canberra. By January 1954 all three firms had submitted…
  • p. 36 …The RAF equipped the new Canberra PR7 with Rolls Royce Avon-109 engines and gave it…
  • p. 37 …discuss the modi fications for high-alti tude flight being made to the US Canberra, the…
  • p. 80 …production was needed to power spedally configured Canberra RB-57Ds for the Air Force. The first…
  • p. 122 …a reconnaissance version of the twin-engine Canberra bomber, similar to the RAF overflight of Kapustin…
  • p. 130 …et N6fOFU~ Chapter 3 .9f British Canberra bombers at Akrotiri, Cyprus: The Anglo-French military buildup…
  • p. 175 …2 and an Air Force RB-57D Canberra. The two air craft cruised along the Soviet…
  • p. 372 …333 Canberra 5. 9. 23-24. 67. 109. 117, 162 Cannon. Clarence 88 Capp, A l…
  • p. 401 …146 Inspector General 61 oxygen mask 62 RB-57D Canberra 162 Third Air Force 89 US…
236
6eeFet AJOl=OSN
Chapter 5
were normal when the pilot made this report. Project managers pre
sumed that the U-2 was downed by a direct hit or near miss by an
SA-2 missile. 55
President Johnson ordered a standdown of overflights of the
PRC. This standdown was welcomed by the Nationalist Chinese
Government, which told the Taiwan Chief of Station that it wanted
··to let some time go by" before more overflights were scheduled.
The Nationalists pointed out that the only remaining qualified U-2 pi
lot had "disqualified" himself because of nervous tension. No new
pilots could be qualified for U-2 flights before mid-August.
The Nationalists then demanded faster and higher flying aircraft
as well as better antimissile equipment for the planes. This request led
some CIA personnel to suspect that Nationalist China had learned
about Project OXCART, the successor to the U-2 that was still under
going testing. Despite the Nationalists' request for better ECM equip
ment, the Defense Department remained reluctant to authorize the use
of the System-XIII false-angle radar jammer on Project TACKLE
U-2s. The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with
its highly advanced traveling-wave tube (TWT) would enable
Communist Bloc technicians to devise countermeasures and also
learn how to produce the highly efficient TWT themselves. As an in
centive for the Nationalist Chinese to agree to more overflights. the
CIA agreed to permit them to process the U-2 film on Taiwan and to
use their own photointerpreters to exploit the film along with US
photointerpreters.
To counter the shortage of pilots in Detachment H, DCI McCone
suggested to the Special Group on 6 August 1964 that civilian CIA
pilots be used to fly missions over mainland China. The group agreed
that the matter should be taken up with President Johnson. On the fol
lowing day, however, Presidential National Security Assistant
McGeorge Bundy informed McCone that, because Secretary of State
Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara opposed the idea. he
would not take it up with the President.5~
" OS,\ History. chap. 17, pp. 53-55 (TS Codeword): Mission folder Cl 74C (7 July I 964),
OSA records, job 66-8-664, box 7 (TS Codeword). Note: beginning in 1964 Nationalist
Chinese mission numbers began with "C" instead of "'GRC. ••
'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 58-59 (TS Codeword).
See,et

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.