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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
234
Sec,et N6FOfU\1
Chapter 5
The increased level of U-2 activity in the Far East during the
spring of 1963 exposed a serious weakness in Projects IDEALIST and
TACKLE, a shortage of aircraft. The Agency only had seven flyable
U-2s when the TACKLE overflights of the PRC began in January
1962, and one of these aircraft had already been lost during an over
flight in September 1962. To deal with this shortage, DCI McCone
asked Defense Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on
IO June 1963 to transfer two U-2s from the Air Force to the CIA. The
Defense Department quickly approved this request. Before the two
Air Force aircraft were placed in service, however, the Agency had
them upgraded with J75/P- l 3A engines and various electronic de
vices, a process that took more than four months. 52
As overflights over the PRC increased, so did concern about the
growing number of Chinese surface-to-air missile sites. The Office of
Special Activities, therefore, got permission from the Defense
Department to equip Project TACKLE aircraft with System-XII
SAM-warning units. These devices alerted the pilot that his aircraft
was being tracked by the FAN SONG acquisition radar, part of the
SA-2's electronic targeting system. The System-XII units also re
corded each radar-tracking sequence. Analysis of these recordings re
vealed changes in the FAN SONG radar's characteristics, information
that proved useful in designing electronic-countermeasure (ECM) de
vices for US aircraft operating over Vietnam during the late l 960s.51
Despite the addition of System-XII in the spring of 1963, the
Nationalist Chinese-piloted U-2s of Project TACKLE had far fewer
ECM devices than other Agency U-2s. Project IDEALIST aircraft
possessed a complete suite of ECM gear in addition to the previously
mentioned System-XII unit. Among this ECM equipment was a de
vice that told the pilot that an SA-2 missile had been launched
(nicknamed the "Oscar-Sierra" unit, which was the acronym for the
expletive U-2 pilots used when they learned that an SA-2 missile was
on the way: "Oh, shit!") and a System-XIII unit that produced
false-angle returns to the homing radar aboard the approaching mis
sile in an effort to steer it away from the aircraft. The Defense
Department opposed installing such devices aboard Detachment H's
U-2s, for fear they could fall into Communist hands.
" OSA History, chap. 16, p. 10 (TS Codeword).
" Ibid., chap. 17, p. 50 (TS Codeword).
Sec,et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.