Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Nevers”34 pages
233 Sec, et NO!iORN Chapter 5 Charbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964 Detachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were post poned. The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but other equipment re mained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G re turned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions, satisfying all of COMOR's requirements for the Sino-Indian border region. By this time, however, Ta Khli had become the main base for Detachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a forward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967.50 Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate Resources in Asia The main focus of Agency U-2 activity in Asia remained the U-2s of Detachment H on Taiwan. In March and April 1963, the USIB met to consider COMOR proposals for aerial reconnaissance of Laos, North __Vietnam, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. All of COMOR's intelligence requirements could best be met by the U-2 be cause heavy cloud cover made it difficult to obtain satellite photogra phy of the region. At the 28 May 1963 meeting of the Special Group, DCI McCone requested authorization for a series of overflights to meet these requirements and stressed the need for additional intelli gence on the atomic energy facilities of the PRC. The Special Group then established a "bank" of four authorizations for overflights of the PRC, subject to monthly review by the Group.51 As a result of the increasing intelligence community interest in the Far East, both Agency U-2 detachments became very active in the region. Detachment G conducted a number of missions over the bor der areas of China, North Vietnam, and Laos during April and May of 1963. At the same time, Detachment H became more adventurous, sending U-2s deeper and deeper into the PRC. These missions in cluded renewed overflights of the missile test range near Baotou and the Lan-chou nuclear facilities, as well as targets in northern China, Manchuria, and west-central China (as far as Koko Nor). " OSA History. chap. 16, pp. 30-3-1 (TS Codeword). " Lay, "USIB History," vol. 3, pp. 391-392 (TS Codeword). 6eeret
Not linked to a story yet.
Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.