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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 24 …Instead of a conventional landing gear, Johnson proposed using two skis and a reinforced belly rib…
  • p. 25 …a perceived shortcoming of the Lockheed design." Another factor in the rejection of Kelly Johnson's…
  • p. 26 …19 On 7 June 1954, Kelly Johnson received a letter from the Air Force rejecting the…
  • p. 27 …Gardner described Kelly Johnson's proposal and showed the drawings to Strong. After this meeting. Strong…
  • p. 30 …To make Kelly Johnson' s revolutionary design a reality, one addit ional source of support was…
  • p. 42 …it. A lthough Land had heard Allen Donovan '' James R. Killian. Jr.. interview by Donald E…
  • p. 48 …do the job in Johnson's airplane. And further, I overlaid a curve showing that with…
  • p. 57 …demanding, and Kelly Johnson agreed that such a move would save a lot of money. Lockheed…
  • p. 58 …Ben A. Rich (current head of the "Skunk Works"). interview by Donald E. Welzenbach and Gregory…
  • p. 69 …staff) flew over Nevada with Kelly Johnson in a small Beechcraft plane piloted by Lockheed's…
  • p. 72 …This responsibility has placed a heavy burden on the Office of Security for establishing procedures to…
  • p. 79 …Battin suggested the method used by Nazi war criminal Hermarnn Goering, a thin glass ampule containing…
  • p. 81 …Kelly Johnson used a '·wet-wing" design for the U-2, which meant that fuel was…
  • p. 89 …Airspeed was such a critical factor that Kelly Johnson added a vernier adjustment to the throttle…
  • p. 162 …By late 1957, Johnson agreed that something had to be done. After a series of tests…
  • p. 276 …The committee examined two other Kelly Johnson designs at this meeting-a tailless subsonic aircraft with…
  • p. 324 …OXCART did win a temporary reprieve in late November 1967. The Johnson administration decided to keep…
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Sec, et NO!iORN
Chapter 5
Charbatia was still not ready in early 1964, so on 31 March 1964
Detachment G staged another mission from Ta Khli. The first mission
out of Charbatia did not take place until 24 May 1964. Three days
later Prime Minister Nehru died, and further operations were post
poned. The pilots and aircraft left Charbatia, but other equipment re
mained in place to save staging costs. In December 1964, when
Sino-Indian tensions increased along the border, Detachment G re
turned to Charbatia and conducted three highly successful missions,
satisfying all of COMOR's requirements for the Sino-Indian border
region. By this time, however, Ta Khli had become the main base for
Detachment G's Asian operations, and Charbatia served merely as a
forward staging base. Charbatia was closed out in July 1967.50
Increasing Responsibilities, Inadequate
Resources in Asia
The main focus of Agency U-2 activity in Asia remained the U-2s of
Detachment H on Taiwan. In March and April 1963, the USIB met to
consider COMOR proposals for aerial reconnaissance of Laos, North
__Vietnam, North Korea, and the People's Republic of China. All of
COMOR's intelligence requirements could best be met by the U-2 be
cause heavy cloud cover made it difficult to obtain satellite photogra
phy of the region. At the 28 May 1963 meeting of the Special Group,
DCI McCone requested authorization for a series of overflights to
meet these requirements and stressed the need for additional intelli
gence on the atomic energy facilities of the PRC. The Special Group
then established a "bank" of four authorizations for overflights of the
PRC, subject to monthly review by the Group.51
As a result of the increasing intelligence community interest in
the Far East, both Agency U-2 detachments became very active in the
region. Detachment G conducted a number of missions over the bor
der areas of China, North Vietnam, and Laos during April and May of
1963. At the same time, Detachment H became more adventurous,
sending U-2s deeper and deeper into the PRC. These missions in
cluded renewed overflights of the missile test range near Baotou and
the Lan-chou nuclear facilities, as well as targets in northern China,
Manchuria, and west-central China (as far as Koko Nor).
" OSA History. chap. 16, pp. 30-3-1 (TS Codeword).
" Lay, "USIB History," vol. 3, pp. 391-392 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.