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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
232
Sec, et NOFORP~
Chapter 5
Detachment G U-2s made four more overflights of the
Sino-Indian border areas in January 1963, which led to a PRC protest
to India. Photography from these missions was used in January and
again in March 1963 to brief Prime Minister Nehru, who then in
formed the Indian Parliament about Communist Chinese troop move
ments along the border. Although Nehru did not reveal the source of
his intelligence, a UPI wire story surmised that the information had
been obtained by U-2s.
The United States had provided photographic coverage of the
border area to India for two reasons. First of all, US policymakers
wanted a clear picture of the area under dispute. In addition, the intel
ligence community wanted to establish a precedent for overflights
from India, which could lead to obtaining a permanent staging base in
India for electronic reconnaissance missions against the Soviet ABM
site at Saryshagan and photographic missions against those portions
of western China that were out of range of Detachment H. In April
1963, Ambassador Galbraith and the Chief of Station at New Delhi
made the first official request to India for a base. The following
month, President Kennedy agreed to DCI McCone's suggestion to
raise the question of a U-2 base in India when he met with India's
President Savepalli Radhakrishnan on 3 June. This meeting resulted
in an Indian offer of an abandoned World War II base at Charbatia.
south of Calcutta.48
The Charbatia base was in poor condition and needed consider
able renovation before it could be used for U-2 operations. Work on
the base by the Indians took much longer than expected, so
Detachment G continued to use Ta Khli when it staged four sorties
over Tibet from 29 September to l O November 1963. In addition to
the coverage of the Sino-Indian border during this series of flights,
the U-2s also photographed all of Thailand to produce a photomap of
the border regions as a quid pro quo for the Thai Government. During
one of these photomapping missions, a U-2 pilot conducted the lon
gest mission ever recorded in this aircraft- I I hours and 45 minutes.
At the end of this flight on IO November 1963, the pilot was in such
poor physical condition that project managers prohibited the schedul
ing of future missions longer than IO hours.'''
"' OSA History: chap. 16. p. 30 (TS Codeword).
·• Mission folder 3238 (l O November !963 ). OSA records. job 67-B-971. bo)( 29 (TS
Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.