Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
Seeret NOFO"N
Chapter 5
226
1961 PFIAB recommended the initiation of a limited number of U-2
photographic missions over the Chinese mainland. The President ap
proved the board's recommendation.
Because the US-Nationalist Chinese overflight program (Project
TACKLE) was a joint effort, both countries participated in the ap
proval process and also shared in the results of the missions. The
USlB COMOR established the requirements for Detachment H's
overflights, which had to be approved by the NSC's Special Group
(5412 Committee) and the President. The Nationalist Chinese
Government also approved all missions flown by its pilots. Under the
terms of an agreement reached with the Nationalist Chinese
Government, film from the overflights of the mainland would be pro
cessed in the United States, with a duplicate positive copy returned to
Nationalist China within IO days. NPIC was responsible for the initial
reporting on these missions.'"
Project TACKLE overflights began early in 1962. Following a 5
January Special Group decision to approve three missions, a
Detachment H U-2 with a Nationalist Chinese pilot flew its first mis
sion over the PRC's missile-testing range at Shuangchengzi on 12
January 1962. Unfortunately, because of faulty navigation or faulty
maps, the aircraft was poorly positioned and obtained only oblique,
rather than vertical, photography of the range. En route to and from
Shuangchengzi, the U-2 overflew Fukien and Chekiang Provinces
looking for suspected deployed missiles, but none could be found in
the mission photography.39
The second Project TACKLE mission took place on 23 February
1962, when a U-2 overflew the PRC's nuclear weapons establishment
at Lan-chou. Photography from this mission revealed that the installa
tion was at least two years away from operational capacity. Two more
missions on 13 and 26 March flew over K'un-ming and central China
covering numerous airfields that had been discovered in satellite pho
tography. The U-2 photographs showed more detail than the satellite
pictures, thereby, providing additional intelligence data, particularly
" OSA History, chap. 17, pp. 18-19, annex 107 (TS Codeword).
,., Ibid., chap. 17, p. 45 (TS Codeword); Mission folder GRC I 00 ( 12 January 1962), OSA
records.job 67-B-972, box 19 (TS Codeword). Note: The numbers for missions flown by
Nationalist Chinese pilots began with GRC (Government of the Republic of China).
~ecret

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.