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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
224
Sec.et NOFORN
Chapter 5
-SeeFet
wanted the Nationalists to be allowed to begin operations, reluctantly
agreed to wait until conditions were favorable.'"' The situation
changed radically in May 1960 after the loss of Powers' U-2 de
stroyed the existing cover story for U-2 operations. Now there was no
longer any reason not to use the Nationalist pilots. In addition, the
Agency soon found itself in need of a base of operations in the Far
East after Detachment C had to leave Japan.
During discussions with Nationalist officials on 6 May 1960, the
CIA's Chief of Station in Taipei, Ray Cline, raised the possibility of
assigning U-2s to the Chinese Air Force. Two weeks later, Gen.
Chiang Ching-kuo, head of the National Security Bureau, approached
Cline informally to propose that the U-2 aircraft based in Japan be
moved to Taiwan. This was followed three days later by an official
offer on behalf of General Chiang's father, Generalissimo Chiang
Kai-shek. President Eisenhower learned of Nationalist China's pro
posal on 18 June. Several weeks later, Richard Bissell suggested that
two U-2s be turned over to the Nationalists for use in overflying the
mainland. The project would be conducted along the lines of Project
STPOLLY. 35
On 26 August l 960, President Eisenhower and the State
Department approved Bissell 's proposal to tum U-2s over to the
Nationalist Chinese rather than move an American detachment to
Taiwan. Using Nationalist pilots for overflights had the advantage of
providing complete deniability for the United States, even if an air
craft was lost over hostile territory. The U-2s would belong to
Nationalist China and would have Nationalist pilots, and there was no
overt US involvement with the overflights. In reality, however, the
United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be
flown. 36
On 7 December l 960, two U-2s were officially licensed for ex
port to Nationalist China as part of a new effort codenamed TACKLE.
These planes came from the Agency's U-2 inventory and arrived in
'" Andrew J. Russo, Low-Level Technical Reconnaissance Over Mainland China
( 1955-1966) (draft), Clandestine Services Historical Program, CSHP-2.348 (CIA: History
Staff, 1972) (S).
'' OSA History. chap. 17, pp. 1-7 (TS Codeword).
'• Ibid., chap. 17. pp. 12-13, 44 (TS Codeword).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.