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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
221
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Chapter 5
Detachment G Missions Over Laos and North Vietnam
In the aftermath of the Powers loss, both of the overseas U-2 detach
ments returned to the United States and their aircraft and personnel
were incorporated into Detachment G at Edwards Air Force Base in
California. This detachment was now responsible for providing cover
age in Asia, and its first mission came in Laos. After the neutralist
Laotian Government of Souvanna Phouma collapsed in early
December 1960, reports began circulating that leftist antigovernment
forces were using Soviet arms. Then on 30 December, a new Laotian
Government appealed for UN aid against what it said was an invasion
from North Vietnam and possibly Communist China. Alarmed over
the possibility of the civil war expanding because of the introduction
of foreign troops, the Eisenhower administration ordered Detachment
G to gather more information on the events in Southeast Asia.
Five Detachment G pilots and planes were ferried to Cubi Point
Naval Air Station in the Philippines to conduct an operation known as
POLECAT. During the period 3 to 18 January 1961, these U-2s made
. s~yen flights over Laos and North Vietnam. To search for the reported
foreign troops, these missions concentrated on the lines of communi
cations leading into Laos from North Vietnam and China. In addition,
the U-2s scanned North Vietnamese airfields for Soviet aircraft to
determine the magnitude of the airdrop operation allegedly supporting
the Pathet Lao troops. NPIC sent photointerpreters to Clark Air Force
Base in the Philippines to obtain an immediate readout of the results
of each mission. The photography did not substantiate the Laotian
claims, and on 26 January the Laotian Government retracted its
charges of a foreign invasion. Detachment G's U-2s returned to
California in early February l 96 I. 31
During the final stages of Operation POLECAT, there was a ma
jor threat to the security of the mission. The film from the flights
made on 16 and I 8 January had been sent to the United States for du
plicate processing. Afterward the film was put aboard an Agency
C-47 on 14 March to ferry it to Washington. During the flight one of
the aircraft's engines failed, forcing the crew to jettison 43 boxes of
highly classified film over mountainous terrain around Williamsport,
Pennsylvania, to keep the craft airborne. After making an emergency
" Ibid., chap. 16. p. 17 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.