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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
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Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
wanted no more part of it. The US Government rapidly withdrew its
support, and the remaining remnants of the rebellion collapsed. Four
years later, the Indonesians freed Pope after Attorney General Robert
Kennedy personally appealed to President Sukarno.
When the revolt ended, the U-2s returned to Atsugi. On the way
back, one of the planes, which was equipped with a System-Y elec
tronic intelligence unit, flew along the coast of China to gather data
on Communist Chinese radars. '5
China Offshore Islands Dispute of 1958
During the summer of l 958, tension between the People's Republic of
China and Nationalist China (Taiwan) increased to such an extent that
on 18 June Detachment C mounted a U-2 mission to film the Chinese
mainland coast and adjacent island areas. On 11 August, People's
Liberation Army (PLA) artillery began bombarding the offshore
islands of Quemoy and Little Quemoy, where the Nationalists had
stationed large numbers of troops to ward off any invasion. On 23
~!,!gust the Communists increased the shelling. After five days of
intense bombardment, which made resupply of the islands from
Taiwan impossible, the PLA commander ordered the Nationalist
garrisons to surrender, intimating that an invasion was imminent.
The Nationalists refused to surrender and received support from
the United States in the form of warships from the 7th Fleet, which
began escorting Nationalist ships carrying supplies to the beleaguered
garrisons.
During this period, Detachment C U-2s flew four missions over
the mainland, searching for troop movements that would indicate that
the PRC was planning to invade the islands. Photos from these mis
sions showed no evidence of a PRC buildup, but the atmosphere in
the region remained tense. Detachment C U-2s flew two more mis
sions (9 September and 22 October) to monitor PRC troop move
ments and again found no indications of preparations for an invasion.
The Offshore Islands Crisis receded in late October 1958 after the
PRC learned that it would not receive support from the Soviet Union
if the crisis escalated into a confrontation with the United States. "6
" Mission folder 1773, (10 June 1958), OSA n:cords, job 67-B-328, box 7 (TS
Codeword): OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).
,. OSA History. chap. 15, p. 27 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.