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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
214
SechH rdOFORP•
Chapter 5
The first U-2 mission over Indonesia took place on 28 March
1958. By 12 June, when the operation was phased out, Detachment C
U-2s had flown 30 missions over the major islands of Indonesia.
Sanitized photos from these missions were used to brief members of
the DDP's Covert Action Staff (CAS), who were in charge of a small
force of World War II-vintage aircraft such as P-5 ls and B-26s used
to support the rebel troops. The CIA's proprietary, Civil Air
Transport, supplied the aircraft, which were based on the Indonesian
island of Morotai and flown by mercenary pilots. Desperately short of
pilots, the CAS asked if some of the U-2 pilots with experience in
World War II aircraft could be detailed to the Morotai effort.
Although such a request represented an improper use of the highly
trained U-2 pilots and posed a potential threat to the entire U-2 pro
gram if one of them were captured, Richard Bissell agreed to send pi
lots James Cherbonneaux and Carmine Vito to help. Both were expe
rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the
rebels' fighter aircraft, the P-51 Mustang. After arriving on Morotai,
Cherbonneaux explained to Vito how to fly the fast and powerful
Mustang while the two were sitting at a makeshift bar on the edge of
the airfield.
Several days later, when Cherbonneaux was off the island on an
other mission, a flight of Indonesian twin-engine bombers of
Czechoslovak manufacture was spotted making its way toward the is
land. Exclaiming, "I'm not going to sit around and wait to be
bombed," Vito had a Filipino mechanic start up a P-51 sitting on the
tarmac. In his first and only flight in a P-51, Vito managed to get the
plane off the ground. Once he was airborne and turned in the direction
of the lumbering bombers, they all took flight in as many directions
as there were aircraft. After firing a few . SO-caliber rounds in the di
rection of the closest bomber, Vito circled the field and landed the air
craft safely.1"
Agency efforts in support of the rebel government proved fruit
less. By early May, Central Government forces had taken most of the
remaining rebel strongholds, and the Sumatran rebellion was deterio
rating into small-scale guerrilla activity. Then on 18 May, an
American mercenary pilot, Allen Lawrence Pope, was shot down on a
bombing mission over Ambon Island. Pope's capture ended Allen
Dulles's enthusiasm for the effort, and President Eisenhower also
" Information supplied by Carmine Vito and James Cherbonneaux to Donald E.
Welienbach, May 1986.
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.