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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
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Seeret NOFOftN
Chapter 5
Long unhappy with President Achmed Sukarno's perceived sym
pathy to Communism and his institution of "guided democracy" in
Indonesia, the CIA, after consultation with the State Department, be
gan in early l 957 to supply financial assistance to a group of dissident
Indonesian Army officers on the island of Sumatra. By 25 September
1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the
course of events in Indonesia and on its recommendation President
Eisenhower authorized the Agency to "employ all feasible covert
means" to support the dissidents. Planning for increased aid of all
types began immediately, and in January 1958 a US arms shipment
for the dissidents arrived in Sumatra. Then on 10 February, the situa
tion came to a head. While Sukarno was out of the country on a state
visit to Japan, the dissident army colonels, without consulting CIA,
organized a Revolutionary Council in Padang, West Sumatra, and de
manded the abolition of President Sukarno's "guided democracy."
Five days later, this council proclaimed itself the new "Revolutionary
Government" of Indonesia. President Sukarno's armed forces re
sponded swiftly to this threat. In late February the Indonesian Air
Force began bombing dissident strongholds, and by mid-March gov
ernment forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against
the rebel-held areas in central Sumatra. Although the Sumatran rebels
were falling back, additional unrest broke out over 1,800 miles away
in the islands of Celebes (Sulawesi), and CIA quickly began supply
ing weapons to these dissidents, too.11
Increasingly involved in Indonesia, the Agency urgently needed
accurate information on the situation there. As in previous crises,
U-2s flew reconnaissance missions. On 24 March 1958, the
Development Projects Staff moved the entire complement of
Detachment C's pilots and planes from Japan to a base more easily
accessible to Indonesia: Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the
Philippines. Cubi Point was far from any facility that could develop
and interpret the U-2 photographs, so two Photo-Intelligence Division
employees went to Clark Airfield, just 30 minutes by air from Cubi
Point, to establish a forward processing center. They arrived on 28
March and had the photo lab ready to go on the following day.:?J
"I Fovert Support to Indonesian Revolutionary Government. /957-1958.
2 vols., Clandestine Service Historical Series, CSHP-53 (CIA: History Staff, 1970) (S):
John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World
War I/ (New York. William Morrow: 1986). pp. 133-144.
0' OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).
Sec,et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.