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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 9 …The struggle between the CIA and the US Air Force to control the U-2 and…
  • p. 72 …2 missions. Access to the photographs taken by the U-2 would be strictly controlled, which…
  • p. 73 …This pact gave the Air Force responsibility for pilot selection and training, weather information, mission plotting…
  • p. 81 …Before the start of a mission, the ground crew set the counters to indicate the total…
  • p. 96 …All of the products from this project would be placed in the new control sys tem…
  • p. 100 …This was an S-band radar used by Soviet forces for early warning and ground-controlled…
  • p. 113 …The President nevertheless maintained tight control over the program and authorized only 10 days of overflights…
  • p. 128 …following day, when the next U-2 mission f m the Middle East. After quickly developing…
  • p. 140 …Welzenbach (S); Mission folder 4020 ( 18 March 1957), OSA records, job 67-B-972, box 7…
  • p. 142 …where they would not interfere with the control surfaces. At the ends of these poles, completely…
  • p. 147 …To take ad vantage of these weaknesses, Detachment C staged three missions from Alaska into the…
  • p. 156 …After these missions, penetrat ion overflights became a rarity. There would be only six more during…
  • p. 167 …U-2 missions. To handle U-2 material, the British created a new control system, which…
  • p. 168 …The British missions would be operationally controlled by CIA project headquarters. Soon afterward four British pilots…
  • p. 169 …where the United Kingdom carried out 27 missions during the two years its pi lots took…
  • p. 170 157 Sec, et MOF'ORI\I Chapter 3 May 1959, and used to fly weather missions…
  • p. 180 …The excellent photography from tnis mission did not reveal a single missile site, but analysts diid…
  • p. 188 …some Soviet airborne-missile fire-control systems. Operation GRAND SLAM, mission 4154 and the 24th deep…
  • p. 191 …key project personnel assembled in the Agency control center that morning (with the exception of Bissell…
  • p. 196 …in cor respondence with Abel's "wife., (probably his Soviet control) in East Germany. In November…
  • p. 204 …in .the DDP in order to maintain control of his overhead reconnais sance projects (the U…
  • p. 220 …Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called…
  • p. 237 …In reality, however, the United States would maintain strict control over the missions to be flown…
  • p. 335 …The flood of information that the U-2 missions gathered led to a major expansion of…
  • p. 340 …In 1959 Bissell became Deputy Director for Plans but kept the reconnaissance projects under his control…
  • p. 348 …System-I used S- and X-band ELINT receivers to collect ground-controlled intercept and air…
  • p. 400 387 Sec1 et NOFORN mission 2023 108 mission 2029 124 mission 3086 200 mission 3088 200…
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Seeret NOFOftN
Chapter 5
Long unhappy with President Achmed Sukarno's perceived sym
pathy to Communism and his institution of "guided democracy" in
Indonesia, the CIA, after consultation with the State Department, be
gan in early l 957 to supply financial assistance to a group of dissident
Indonesian Army officers on the island of Sumatra. By 25 September
1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the
course of events in Indonesia and on its recommendation President
Eisenhower authorized the Agency to "employ all feasible covert
means" to support the dissidents. Planning for increased aid of all
types began immediately, and in January 1958 a US arms shipment
for the dissidents arrived in Sumatra. Then on 10 February, the situa
tion came to a head. While Sukarno was out of the country on a state
visit to Japan, the dissident army colonels, without consulting CIA,
organized a Revolutionary Council in Padang, West Sumatra, and de
manded the abolition of President Sukarno's "guided democracy."
Five days later, this council proclaimed itself the new "Revolutionary
Government" of Indonesia. President Sukarno's armed forces re
sponded swiftly to this threat. In late February the Indonesian Air
Force began bombing dissident strongholds, and by mid-March gov
ernment forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against
the rebel-held areas in central Sumatra. Although the Sumatran rebels
were falling back, additional unrest broke out over 1,800 miles away
in the islands of Celebes (Sulawesi), and CIA quickly began supply
ing weapons to these dissidents, too.11
Increasingly involved in Indonesia, the Agency urgently needed
accurate information on the situation there. As in previous crises,
U-2s flew reconnaissance missions. On 24 March 1958, the
Development Projects Staff moved the entire complement of
Detachment C's pilots and planes from Japan to a base more easily
accessible to Indonesia: Cubi Point Naval Air Station in the
Philippines. Cubi Point was far from any facility that could develop
and interpret the U-2 photographs, so two Photo-Intelligence Division
employees went to Clark Airfield, just 30 minutes by air from Cubi
Point, to establish a forward processing center. They arrived on 28
March and had the photo lab ready to go on the following day.:?J
"I Fovert Support to Indonesian Revolutionary Government. /957-1958.
2 vols., Clandestine Service Historical Series, CSHP-53 (CIA: History Staff, 1970) (S):
John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World
War I/ (New York. William Morrow: 1986). pp. 133-144.
0' OSA History, chap. 15, pp. 25-26 (TS Codeword).
Sec,et

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.