Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Headquarters”22 pages
209 perceived as a jurisdictional dispute. Presidential Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy told DDCI Carter that "the whole thing looks to me like two quarreling children." 19 Furthermore, no one wanted to speak out against a decision that the President had already made. Once the decision was clearly irrevocable, the Agency gave its complete support to the Air Force in preparing for the upcoming overflight. A SAC U-2 pilot had already arrived unannounced at the CIA's U-2 Detachment at Edwards Air Force Base on 11 October, and the CIA U-2 detachment put him through a hasty training program to familiarize him with the U-2C. By Sunday, 14 October 1962, the weather over Cuba had cleared, and the first SAC overflight of the island took place. When the U-2 returned, its film was rushed to the National Photographic Interpretation Center. By the evening of 15 October, photointerpreters had found evidence of the presence of MRBMs in the San Cristobal area. NPIC Director Arthur Lundahl immediately notified DD[ Ray Cline, who in turn notified DDCI Carter (DCI McCone had again left town). As the readout progressed and the evi dence became firmer, the DOI notified National Security Adviser Bundy and Roger Hilsman of the Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, who informed Secretary of State Dean Rusk. On the following morning, 16 October, DDCI Carter briefed the President on the results of the 14 October mission."0 Now that the presence of Soviet medium-range surface-to-sur face missiles in Cuba had been confirmed, the rules for U-2 mission approval changed. The Strategic Air Command received blanket ap proval to fly as many missions as needed to cover Cuba completely, without again consulting the Special Group. During the week that fol lowed the discovery of the missiles, SAC U-2s conducted multiple missions each day (see map on page 203). U-2 photography was sup plemented by low-level photography taken by high-performance Navy and Air Force aircraft. Throughout the remainder of the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Agency's U-2 pilots remained idle, but the photointerpreters at NPIC did yeoman service in studying the ,., Telephone conversation between DDC I Carter and McGeorge Bundy, 12 October 1962, DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo" 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword). ,. For a more detailed account of NPIC's discovery of the Soviet missiles in Cuba. see Dino Brugioni. The Cuban Missile Crisis-Phase I. 29 August-16 October 1962, DDS&T Historical Series. NPIC-1 (CIA: NPIC. 1971) (S). Secret NOFORN Chapter 5 Seeret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.