Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
208
secret 1\JoFonra
Chapte r 5
DOC/ Marshall S. Carter
Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air
Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on l 2 October,
when President Kennedy transferred "responsi bility, to include com
mand and control and operational decisions. with regard to U-2 re
connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of
Defense.05
The Air Force then aske:d to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.
The Acting DCI. Lt. Gen. Mairshall S. Carter. US Army. reacted
strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one
point he remarked, " I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's
perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." 16 In a
series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra
tion officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of
the flights at such a crucial cimi::. T he Agency operation, Carter
pointed out, was already in place aind working well, whereas the Air
Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly
with the U-2C. which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also
emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more
powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put
in a brand new green pi lot just because he happens to have on a blue
suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu
nication and ground support system on 72 hours· notice to me doesn 't
make a God damn bit of sense. Mr. Secretary." " DDCI Carter admit
ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's
but suggested at one point. "Let's take one of my boys and put him in
a blue suit. •· •~ Realizing. however. that the pilot would probably have
to come from the Air Force. Carter concentrated his efforts on trying
to convince DOD and administration of ficials to conduct an orderly
transition by allowing the CIA to continue i ts operation for a few
weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually ta.Icing
over command and control. Carter's efforts were i n vain. The Air
Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra
tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they
" Memorandum for DC C McCone from McGeorge Bundy. "'Reconnaissance Overflights
of Cuba:· 12 October 1962. DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo:( I 7. folder I 8 (TSJ.
•· Telephone conversation between DOC I Ca11er and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. boll 17. folder 18 (TS Co<leword).
' ' Telephone con versation between DOC I Caner and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. box 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
" Telephone conversation between DOC I Carter and G<!n. William McKee. 12 October
I 962. DC I recorti~. job 80-8-1676R. bo.\ 17. folder 13 (TS Cod.:word).
See,et

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.