Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

Open the PDF at page 221 Original source ↗

“Lockheed”60+ pages

  • p. 4 …8 Lockheed CL-282 Supporters and the CIA. ........................................ 13 Scientists and Overhead Reconnaissance ............................................... 17 The BEACON…
  • p. 6 …260 Competition Between Lockheed and Convair ...................................... 267 The Selection of the Lockheed Design .............. ... ................ ................ 270 Efforts To…
  • p. 12 …excellent technical study of the U-2: Lockheed U-2 (l 983). There has also been…
  • p. 22 …Immediately after returning to California, Carter proposed to Lockheed Vice President L. Eugene Root (previously the…
  • p. 23 10 Secret ld0F8RN Chapter 1 Lockheed also submit a design. Carter noted that the proposed aircraft…
  • p. 24 …who then asked Lockheed to Kelly Johnson . sμbmit a specific proposal. In early April, Kelly Johnson…
  • p. 25 . 12 Sec,et NOFORN Chapter 1 The Lockheed CL-282 Development Planning. According to Wienberg, General…
  • p. 26 …Despite the Air Force's selection of the X-16, Lockheed continued to work on the…
  • p. 27 …Proposals for special reconnaissance aircraft have been re ceived in the Air Staff from Lockheed. Fairchild…
  • p. 28 …range are not as good as the Lockheed CL-282. :; Gardner's enthusiasm for the CL…
  • p. 29 …Few detaiils about Dulles's precise attitude toward the proposed Lockheed reconnaissance aircraft are available, but…
  • p. 37 …for Philip Strong of the CIA had told him that the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation had designed…
  • p. 39 …Thus, even though the Lockheed CL-282 had several important sources of support by September I954…
  • p. 40 …Council.'A Project Three Support for the Lockheed CL-282 Chapter 1 James R. Killian, Jr…
  • p. 42 …Agency.~·1 Land learned the details of Lockheed's proposed CL-282 aircraft soon after he…
  • p. 43 30 Sec, et NOFORM Chapter 1 briefly mention a Lockheed design for a high-flying aircraft…
  • p. 44 …During September and October the Project Three study group met frequently to discuss the Lockheed design…
  • p. 47 …The Lockheed super glider will fly at 70,000 feet, well out of the reach of…
  • p. 48 …Putt, to oppose the adoption of the Lockheed design. The officials ar gued that the Bell…
  • p. 49 …He used Gardner's statement to convince Lockheed's senior management to approve the project, which…
  • p. 50 …small group of prominent scientists that the Lockheed design represented the best possible overhead reconnais- sance…
  • p. 52 …afternoon of 3 Decembeli, they ' Although the Lockheed CL-282 was not designated as the U…
  • p. 53 …r the airframes to be built by Lockheed. His query was greeted with silence. Everyone present…
  • p. 55 …This category in cluded maintenance and support personnel from Lockheed (five per aircraft), the pilots, and…
  • p. 56 …to be settled, including the contract with Lockheed. Nevertheless. work on the U-2 began as…
  • p. 57 …A general contractor such as Lockheed can purchase much, if not all, of the supplies needed…
  • p. 58 …During the final contract negotiations in the spring of 1958, Lockheed and the US Government agreed…
  • p. 59 …Aircraft," 9 Dc:cc:mbc:r 195-i. Lockheed Contract Filc:s. OSA Records (S ). SeeFet
  • p. 61 …F. Boc:hrne. Summary Report: Reconnaissance Aircraft. Lockheed Aircraft Corpor.ition Report I04'.!0. 28 January…
  • p. 63 …1954, even before the CIA adopted the Lockheed proposal. Baker quickly recognized, however, that he would…
  • p. 69 …1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sea,at
  • p. 70 …By July 1955 the base was ready, and Agency, Air Force, and Lockheed personnel began moving…
  • p. 74 61 project-the construction and testing of the aircraft-remained the ex clusive province of Lockheed…
  • p. 77 …The first model of the pressure suit, used by Lockheed test pilots, made no provision for…
  • p. 79 …Geary told Culbertson that the Lockheed CL-282 was going to be known officially as the…
  • p. 81 …former director of Lockheed's Skunk Works. 10 Donald E. Welzenbach, 14 March 1986 (U): Miller…
  • p. 84 …7 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2, p. 22. "' OSA Hiswry, chap. 8, pp. 12-14…
  • p. 85 …how to transfer Lockheed employees from Burbank to Area 5 l without arousing a great deal…
  • p. 88 …Colonel Yancey was in charge of six SAC pilots who were to be trained by Lockheed…
  • p. 90 …CIA, which then placed an order with Lockheed for 29 U-2s in configurations to be…
  • p. 107 …U-2 cover story stating that a Lockheed-developed aircraft would be flown by the USAF…
  • p. 143 …Lockheed mechanics had mounted the various RAINBOW devices on the prototype U-2, a Lockheed test…
  • p. 144 …Unable to restart the power plant, Lockheed tesi: pilot Robert Sieker bailed out but was struck…
  • p. 145 …The loss of one of Lockheed's best test pilots. as well as the pro totype…
  • p. 157 …As a substitute, Lockheed began working to develop a paint with radar-suppressant qualities, but this…
  • p. 162 …After a series of tests over Edwards AFB, Lockheed began coating the U-2s with a…
  • p. 188 …Although it had been refurbished by Lockheed and now had the more powerful 175 engine that…
  • p. 199 …In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963…
  • p. 200 …Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which…
  • p. 209 …2 One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up grade six older U…
  • p. 211 …In May 1961, Lockheed began modifying Agency U-2s so that they could be refueled in…
  • p. 220 …story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico…
  • p. 230 …for Detachment C Late in l 958, Lockheed began refitting the Agency's 13 remaining U…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 236 …U-2 missions, and the Air Force, which had Lockheed P-2V7 and P3A reconnaissance aircraft
  • p. 238 …The planes were maintained by Lockheed mechanics under con tract to the CIA. The Agency attempted…
  • p. 255 …All Air Force and CIA U-2s were or dered back to Lockheed for ultrasonic inspection…
  • p. 260 …The Agency dispatched several pilots to Taiwan under the cover of Lockheed employees working on a…
  • p. 264 …G in California-with three more at Lockheed undergo ing repair. The Agency had originally ordered…
  • p. 265 …Francis Gary Powers was one of the Lockheed test pilots who checked out this new aircraft…
208
secret 1\JoFonra
Chapte r 5
DOC/ Marshall S. Carter
Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air
Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on l 2 October,
when President Kennedy transferred "responsi bility, to include com
mand and control and operational decisions. with regard to U-2 re
connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of
Defense.05
The Air Force then aske:d to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.
The Acting DCI. Lt. Gen. Mairshall S. Carter. US Army. reacted
strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one
point he remarked, " I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's
perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." 16 In a
series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra
tion officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of
the flights at such a crucial cimi::. T he Agency operation, Carter
pointed out, was already in place aind working well, whereas the Air
Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly
with the U-2C. which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also
emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more
powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put
in a brand new green pi lot just because he happens to have on a blue
suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu
nication and ground support system on 72 hours· notice to me doesn 't
make a God damn bit of sense. Mr. Secretary." " DDCI Carter admit
ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's
but suggested at one point. "Let's take one of my boys and put him in
a blue suit. •· •~ Realizing. however. that the pilot would probably have
to come from the Air Force. Carter concentrated his efforts on trying
to convince DOD and administration of ficials to conduct an orderly
transition by allowing the CIA to continue i ts operation for a few
weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually ta.Icing
over command and control. Carter's efforts were i n vain. The Air
Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra
tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they
" Memorandum for DC C McCone from McGeorge Bundy. "'Reconnaissance Overflights
of Cuba:· 12 October 1962. DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo:( I 7. folder I 8 (TSJ.
•· Telephone conversation between DOC I Ca11er and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. boll 17. folder 18 (TS Co<leword).
' ' Telephone con versation between DOC I Caner and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. box 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
" Telephone conversation between DOC I Carter and G<!n. William McKee. 12 October
I 962. DC I recorti~. job 80-8-1676R. bo.\ 17. folder 13 (TS Cod.:word).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.