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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
208
secret 1\JoFonra
Chapte r 5
DOC/ Marshall S. Carter
Washington for California and did not return until 14 October. Air
Force control of the Cuban overflights became official on l 2 October,
when President Kennedy transferred "responsi bility, to include com
mand and control and operational decisions. with regard to U-2 re
connaissance overflights of Cuba" from the CIA to the Department of
Defense.05
The Air Force then aske:d to borrow two of CIA's U-2Cs.
The Acting DCI. Lt. Gen. Mairshall S. Carter. US Army. reacted
strongly to the Air Force takeover of a major CIA operation. At one
point he remarked, " I think it's a hell of a way to run a railroad. It's
perfectly obviously a geared operation to get SAC in the act." 16 In a
series of conversations with high-ranking Air Force and administra
tion officials, Carter argued against changing command and control of
the flights at such a crucial cimi::. T he Agency operation, Carter
pointed out, was already in place aind working well, whereas the Air
Force lacked experience in controlling U-2 overflights, particularly
with the U-2C. which was not in the Air Force inventory. Carter also
emphasized that Air Force pilots lacked experience with the more
powerful J75 engines in the U-2C. He told Roswell Gilpatric, "To put
in a brand new green pi lot just because he happens to have on a blue
suit and to completely disrupt the command and control and commu
nication and ground support system on 72 hours· notice to me doesn 't
make a God damn bit of sense. Mr. Secretary." " DDCI Carter admit
ted that the Air Force's cover story was probably better than the CIA's
but suggested at one point. "Let's take one of my boys and put him in
a blue suit. •· •~ Realizing. however. that the pilot would probably have
to come from the Air Force. Carter concentrated his efforts on trying
to convince DOD and administration of ficials to conduct an orderly
transition by allowing the CIA to continue i ts operation for a few
weeks using an Air Force pilot, and the Air Force gradually ta.Icing
over command and control. Carter's efforts were i n vain. The Air
Force insisted on immediate control of the operation, and administra
tion officials were unwilling to become involved in what they
" Memorandum for DC C McCone from McGeorge Bundy. "'Reconnaissance Overflights
of Cuba:· 12 October 1962. DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. bo:( I 7. folder I 8 (TSJ.
•· Telephone conversation between DOC I Ca11er and McGeorge Bundy, 13 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. boll 17. folder 18 (TS Co<leword).
' ' Telephone con versation between DOC I Caner and Roswell Gilpatric, 12 October 1962.
DCI records. job 80-B-1676R. box 17. folder 18 (TS Codeword).
" Telephone conversation between DOC I Carter and G<!n. William McKee. 12 October
I 962. DC I recorti~. job 80-8-1676R. bo.\ 17. folder 13 (TS Cod.:word).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.