Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
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207 defenses of Cuba. If this overflight did not provoke an SA-2 reaction. the study recommended "maximum coverage of the western end of the island by multiple U-2s simultaneously." u Because the danger posed by the SA-2 sites was one of the major topics at the Special Group meeting, DCI McCone brought along Col. Jack C. Ledford (USAF), head of the Office of Special Activities, who presented a vulnerability analysis that estimated the odds of losing a U-2 over Cuba at I in 6. The Special Group approved the recommended flight over San Cristobal. As the Special Group meeting was breaking up, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric and the Air Force repre sentative questioned the adequacy of the Agency's cover story, which was that its pilots were Lockheed employees on a ferry flight to Puerto Rico. The Air Force and DOD representatives argued that it would be better to use Air Force pilots and state in the event of a mis hap that the overflight was a routine Air Force peripheral surveillance mission that had gone off course. McCone then asked Colonel Ledford"s opinion of the proposed change. Ledford agreed that the .DOD cover story was better but pointed out that the SAC U-2s were much more vulnerable than those of the Agency, which had superior electronic countermeasures and a higher maximum altitude. Ledford then suggested that Air Force pilots use Agency aircraft after receiv ing familiarization training. After leaving the Special Group meeting. McCone and Gilpatric met with President Kennedy, who approved the San Cristobal mission and the use of Air Force pilots.'" Two days later (11 October), Air Force and CIA representatives met to discuss the change in cover stories. Herbert Scoville, CIA Deputy Director for Research, agreed that in the long run the Air Force cover story was best but emphasized that an Air Force pilot should not be used until he had received adequate training. The con versation then turned to the issue of who would run the next mission, the CIA or the Air Force. Strongly favoring Air Force control of the U-2 missions over Cuba. the DOD representatives called DCI McCone and obtained his consent. Shortly thereafter, McCone left '·' Ibid., p. 31 (TS Codeword). " Brig. Gen. Jack C. Ledford, USAF Ret., interview by Gregory W. Pedlow. Washington. DC. 20 February I 987 (S); Memorandum for DCI McCone from Herbert Scoville. Jr.. Deputy Director (Research). "The Chronology of Evt:nts Leading to tht: Trans for of Cuban Overflight Responsibility," 28 February I 963, DC! rt:cords, job 80-B-1676R. bo~ 17. folder 18 (S). Sec, el PdOfOFmi Chapter 5 Seara~
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.