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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

Open the PDF at page 219 Original source ↗

“The Advance”34 pages

  • p. 6 …255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 11 / Chapter 1 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …seen on pilot Francis Gary Powers) advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 206 …In 1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special Activities. The Office…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 …Chapter 5 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM • 60 equipment. •• Mission…
  • p. 265 …but some was the result of technological advances. The ini tial order for eight of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the…
  • p. 356 343 Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD…
206
Secret NOFORN
Chapter 5
that had been placed on U-2 overflights of Cuba, DCI McCone told
the Special Group on 4 October 1962 that their policy of avoiding
SAM sites had restricted the Agency to using the U-2 only in Cuba's
southeastern quadrant. He questioned "whether this was a reasonable
restriction at this time, particularly since the SAM's were almost cer
tainly not operational." 11 The Special Group then requested the
preparation of an overall program for reconnaissance of Cuba in time
for its next meeting on 9 October.
In the meantime, C[A U-2s continued the reconnaissance pro
gram that the Special Group had approved in September. In early
October two peripheral missions-3098 along the southeastern coast
on 5 October and 3100 along the northern coast on 7 October (see
map on page 203)-discovered an additional five SAM sites. This
brought the total to 19, but there was still no evidence of sur
face-to-surface missiles.
Evidence was mounting that the portion of Cuba that the
September and early October missions had avoided was the most
likely location for Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs).
On 6 October 1962, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance rec
ommended frequent and regular coverage of Cuba, pointing in partic
ular to the need for renewed coverage of western Cuba:
The absence of coverage of the western end since August 29,
coupled with the rate of construction we have observed, means
that there may well be many more sites now being built of which
we are una;vare. Ground observers have in several recent in
stances reported sightings of what they believe to be the SS-4
(SHYSTER) MRBM in Cuba. These reports must be confirmed or
denied hy photo coverage.,: Attached to this memorandum was a
list of targets, ~vith the area around San Cristobal at the top.
On 9 October the Special Group met to discuss COMOR's rec
ommendations, the most important of which was a U-2 flight over the
.. suspect MRBM site as soon as weather permits." This mission was
also designed to pass over one of the SA-2 sites that was thought to
be most nearly operational in order to determine the status of SA-2
" Minutes of the Special Group meeting. 4 October 1962. in Memorandum for DC!
:\lcCone from J. S. Earman. Inspector General, ··Handling of Raw Intelligence
Information During the Cuban Arms Buildup." 20 November 1962, DC! records, job
80-B- 1676R. box I 7 (TS Codeword).
" Lehman Report. p. 30 (TS Codc::word).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.