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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 6 …255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 11 / Chapter 1 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …seen on pilot Francis Gary Powers) advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 206 …In 1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special Activities. The Office…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 …Chapter 5 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM • 60 equipment. •• Mission…
  • p. 265 …but some was the result of technological advances. The ini tial order for eight of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the…
  • p. 356 343 Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD…
205
overflights of Cuban territory. He argued that the loss of an aircraft on
a mission that combined both types of flights would make it difficult
for the United States to stand on its rights to fly over international wa
ters. Bundy and Carter therefore agreed to split the proposed recon
naissance program into four missions: two overflights and two
peripheral flights, all planned for maximum safety. The overflights
were thus designed to be quick "in-and-out" operations across the
narrow width of the island instead of flights along the entire length of
Cuba, as had been the case previously. (As the map on page 202 illus
trates, the 5 September mission was the last one to fly along the
length of the island.) As an additional precaution, flightpaths would
be laid out to avoid known SAM sites. Although these changes
greatly reduced the danger to the U-2, they slowed the gathering of
information on the Soviet buildup by reducing each mission's
9
coverage.
To ensure that the photographs taken by these missions were of
the highest quality, the CIA decided to conduct flights only when the
weather along the flight routes was less than 25 percent overcast.
Weather proved to be a major problem during the month of
Se.ptember. Unfavorable forecasts (along with a brief standdown of
U-2 overflights after the loss of the Nationalist Chinese U-2) pre
vented the launching of any missions from 6 through 16 September.
Moreover, when mission 3091 finally flew on 17 September, the fa
vorable weather forecast proved inaccurate and heavy clouds pre
vented the mission from obtaining usable photography. Bad weather
continued to rule out missions until 26 September, when mission
3093 covered eastern Cuba and found three additional SAM sites.
Three days later mission 3095 flew over the Isle of Pines and Bay of
Pigs area, finding one more SAM site and a coastal-defense cruise
missile site. 10
The cautious series of U-2 flights in September had turned up
many more SAM sites but no concrete evidence of the presence of
surface-to-surface missiles. Growing impatient with the restrictions
' Lehman Report, pp. 12-13 (TS Codeword).
'" DCI John A. McCone, Memorandum for the Record, ··U-2 Overflights of Cuba. 29
August through 14 October 1962,"" 27 February 1963, DCI n:cords, job 80-8-1676R. box.
17, folder 18 {S). Although this DCI memo states that ··the delay in completing the photo
graphic coverage was due solely to the unfavorable weather predicted during this period,"
a more contemporary COMOR memo re~orted a standdown of U-2 overtlights until 16
September as a result of the loss of mission No. GRC-127 over China on 8 September.
Memorandum for DOC! Carter from James Q. Reber. Chairman, COMOR. "Historical
Analysis of U-2 Overflights of Cuba,"" 24 October 1962. IC Staff. COMIREX records. job
33-B- I 22A. box I. "Cuba Requirements. 1961-63" (TS Codeword).
Sec, el NOFORN
Chapter 5
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.