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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 18 …Leghorn persuaded his superiors to submit his suggestion to the Pentagon for funding. He had not…
  • p. 20 …Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in…
  • p. 22 …become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program, was in the Pentagon on business…
  • p. 24 …for the construction and maintenance of 30 aircraft to a group of senior Pentagon official s…
  • p. 26 …He had been present at Kelly Johnson's presentation on the CL-282 at the Pentagon…
  • p. 27 …with Strong in the Pentagon on 12 May 1954, six clays before the Wright Air Deve…
  • p. 52 …Late on the morning of 2 December 1954, Dulles told Bissell to go to the Pentagon…
  • p. 91 …He then briefed a high-level Pentagon panel that included the Secretary of the Air Force…
  • p. 92 …After a half hour passed, the base commander called the Pentagon to ask where the crippled…
  • p. 225 …By 25 September 1957, the National Security Council had become concerned with the course of events…
  • p. 251 …Early in 1963 the Agency sought special funds from the Pentagon to de velop a high…
  • p. 363 …CIA and Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War fl. New York: William Morrow, 1986. ---. The Soviet…
199
Sec, el NOFORN
Chapter 5
Aftermath of the Bay of Pigs
invasion, 20 April 1961
Refueling a U-2 in flight was a very delicate task. When fully
loaded with fuel, KC-135 tankers found it difficult to reduce airspeed
• w-200 knots, the safest speed for refueling a U-2. As for the U-2s,
they were in a very vulnerable position when approaching a tanker at
200 knots because their frai l wings could not stand much stress. As a
result, U-2 pi lots had to approach the KC- 135 tankers very carefully
in order to avoid the vonexes from the wingtips of the tanker and the
turbulence caused by the four large jet engines. During the first few
years of refueling operations, two U-2s crashed after their wings
broke off as they crossed into the turbulent area behind the tai11kers;
one of the pilots was killed."
The in-flight refueling capability was a useful modificati.on to
the U-2, but it could not dramatically extend mission length. The
main limiting factor remained pilot fatigue, which prevented missions
from lasting longer than approximately 10 hours.
U-2 Coverage During the Cuban Missile Crisis
Cuba remained a high-priority target even after the Bay of Pigs inva
sion failed in April 1961. Soon afterward, Detachment G U-2s ibegan
flying monthly missions over Cuba in a program known as Project
• Ibid .. p. 11 -12 (TS Cod~word).

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.