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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
Sec, et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
Nothing came of the proposal to resume overflights in the fall of
1961, as both the USIB and the Special Group came out against it,
but, as long as U-2 photography remained clearly superior to satellite
photography, the thought of obtaining U-2 coverage of the Soviet
Union remained tempting. In February 1962, the USIB seriously con
sidered a COMOR proposal to send a U-2 over Kamchatka to photo
graph Soviet antiballistic-missile facilities but finally decided to wait
for the results of an Air Force peripheral mission. The board later ac
cepted DCI McCone's recommendation to seek satellite rather than
U-2 coverage of the area.4
With both the CIA and the State Department strongly opposed to
sending the highly vulnerable U-2 over the Soviet Union, prospects
for resuming flights remained slight unless the international situation
197
worsened to such a degree that overflights would be worth the risks
involved. Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l
May 1960 proved to be the last CIA overflight of the Soviet Bloc.
Yet, the U-2 remained useful, for it could operate successfully in
other areas with less developed radar and air defense systems. After
May 1960, the main focus of U-2 activity shifted to two new areas:
Latin America, where U-2s would play an extremely important role
during the early 1960s, and the Far East, where CIA U-2s were active
from 1958 until 1974, when the Agency's involvement in manned re
connaissance finally ended.
U-2 OPERATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA
U-2 Support to the Bay of Pigs Invasion
During late summer 1960, the Directorate of Plans was planning a
counterrevolutionary invasion of Cuba for the following year. To sup
port this effort, the Agency asked the National Security Council's
' Memorandum for the Special Group from COMOR, "Illustrations of Policy Restraints
on the Collection of Information through Overflight of Denied Areas during 1962," 14
December 1962, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-8-1 I9A, box 1 (TS Codeword);
James S. Lay, "The United States Intelligence Board, 1958- I965," (draft) CIA History
Staff MS-2, 1974, p. 385 (TS Codeword). One year later Saryshagan was the topic of US
Intelligence Board deliberations. In October 1963 the board asked COMOR to prepare
recommendations on the need for an electronic intelligence-gathering mission against the
Soviet ABM installations at Saryshagan. The proposed mission would not, however, vio
late Soviet airspace; instead, the U-2 would fly over the portion of the People's Republic
of China closest to Saryshagan. Lay, "USIB History," pp. 393-94 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.