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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
Sec1et NOFOAN
Chapter 5
196
overflights of the Soviet Union during the Berlin Crisis in the summer
and fall of 1961. On 14 September 1961, Kelly Johnson noted in his
project log:
Have had request from Mr. Bissell to propose ways and means
for increasing safety of the U-2 on probable overflights . ... It
seems that President Kennedy, who publicly stated that no U-2 '.s
would ever be over Russia while he was president, has requested
additional flights. Some poetic justice in this. 2
One week later Colonel Geary called to order Lockheed to up
grade six older U-2s into U-2Cs with the more powerful engines on a
priority basis, even if it meant taking people off the work on the suc
cessor aircraft in order to speed up the conversions.
Shortly thereafter, the resumption of overflights became a major
topic of discussion within the intelligence community. On 25
September 1961, the Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance pre
pared a detailed "Justification for U-2 Photography over the USSR,"
which argued in favor of U-2 missions over selected, high-priority
targets such as ICBM complexes. The COMOR paper stated that sat
ellite photography did not provide sufficient detail to answer many
critical questions about the Soviet ICBM program. To back up this
contention, the report placed U-2 and satellite photography of the
same Soviet targets side by side, clearly demonstrating the far supe
rior resolution of the U-2's cameras. Not all members of COMOR
supported the resumption of overflights, however. When COMOR
formally recommended this course of action to the USIB on 1
October 1961, the State Department and CIA members dissented,
having found "insufficient justification for resuming U-2 overflights
of the USSR at this time." 3
' Johnson. "Log for Project X," 14 September 1961. In preparation for the possible re
sumption of overflights. Kelly Johnson began thinking about what to do in a worst case
scenario like that of I May 1960. He noted in the project log on 21 September 1961:
One ofthe greatest technical problems and. ofcourse. a great moral one, is how we insure
destroying the aircraft and the pilot should the mission fail. I have proposed a rime-alti
tude fusing setup for multitude bombs, that looks like it should do the trick. Beerli [Col.
Stanley Beerli, USAF. Director of the Office of Special Activities/ doesn 'r want anything to
do with this. bur we will go ahead and develop it in case someone decides it is necessary.
·' Memorandum for USIB from COMOR. "Justification for U-2 Photography over the
USSR." 25 September 1961, IC Staff, COMIREX records, job 33-T- l 23A. box 10,
"COMOR (General)" (TS Codeword); Memorandum for USIB from COMOR, "Require
ments for Resumption of U-2 Overt1ights of the USSR," 1 October 1961, IC Staff.
COMIREX records, job 33-B- l l 9A, box I (TS Codeword).
- Seerat

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.