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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 4 …17 The BEACON HILL Report .................................................................... 17 Concern About the Danger of a Soviet Surprise Attack ................ 19…
  • p. 13 Helen Hill Kleyla and Robert D. O'Hern. This 16-volume Top Secret Codeword study of…
  • p. 14 …view of the "other side of the hill." With the advent of dry film, it became…
  • p. 30 …Dulles The BEACON HILL Report In 1951 the Air Force sought even more assistance from scientists…
  • p. 31 …Their head quarters was located over a secretarial school on Beacon Hill, which soon became the…
  • p. 32 …et NOFOAN Chapter 1 document on 15 June 1952, the BEACON HILL Report advocated radical approaches…
  • p. 34 …Created in July 1953, the Intelligence Systems Panel (ISP) included several experts from the BEACON HILL…
  • p. 37 …sance needs ex.pressed in the BEACON HILL Report. Theoretically, he explained to the panel. any…
  • p. 41 …H. T. Friis R. Mettler A.G. Hill E. Purcell W. H. Radford E. H. Plesset…
  • p. 44 …members had been discussing since the BEACON HILL and Intelligence Systems Panel meetings. James Baker was…
  • p. 45 …Having participated in the BEACON HILL Study and the Intelligence Systems Panel, several Project Three members…
  • p. 344 …He headed the Beacon Hill Panel in 1952 and later became director of Lincoln Laboratories. PARANGOSKY…
  • p. 345 …of several advisory panels, including the BEACON HILL project. He helped Baker decide what cameras to…
  • p. 364 …BEACON HILL Report: Problems of Air Force Intelligence and Reconnaissance. Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 15 June…
  • p. 371 …Soviet Union 137 Beacon Hill 17-19. 21. 24, 3 1-32. 331-33'.! BEACON HILL…
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Sec, et N6f8AN
Chapter 5J•.·l •
.
_,. · ..
U-2 Operatiqns After
May 1960
The loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 over the Soviet Union on l
May 1960 marked the end of the aircraft's use over the Soviet Bloc.
Soon after the May Day incident. President Eisenhower ordlered an
end to overflights. Similarly, his successor, John F. Kennedy, told a 25
January 1961 press conference, " I have ordered that the flights not be
resumed, which is a conti nuation of the order gi ven by President
.. ..Eisenhower in May of last year." T his was not a bind_ing pledge, as
John A. McCone (who became DCI in November 196 1) poi nted out
to President K ennedy's successor. Lyndon 8 . Johnson, on 15 January
1964 in response to the new President's request for information on
U-2 overflight policies:
Contrary to popular assumption, President Kennedy did not
make any pledge or give an assurance, at least publicly. that
there would be no further overflights. He limited his response to
a statement that he had ordered that the flights not be r,':?sumed.
An order, obviously, is valid only until countermanded.'
Technically, McCone was correct, but no President was l ikely to
order a resumption of overflights of the Soviet Union without very
good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because
satellite photography gradually began to fill the gap left by the end of
U-2 coverage.
A lthough there were several proposals to resume overflights of
the Soviet Union in the years that followed, none reached the mi ssion
planning stage. T he Kennedy administration came closest to resuming
' Memorandum for President Johnson from DCI McCone... Response to Query
Concerning U-2 Overflight Policy:· 15 January 1964. DCI records. job 80-8-1676R. box
17. folder 14 (TS Codeword).
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.