Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“The Pentagon”12 pages
190 Sec, et NOfiO~N Chapter 4 Most military reconnaissance missions were approved or disap proved at the JCS level, but the most sensitive missions were submit ted through the Secretary of Defense to the Special Group for approval. In addition to this Department of Defense approval path, the military services could also submit requirements through the DCI us ing their representatives on COMOR. As a result, the military ser vices had two channels for submitting reconnaissance missions to the Special Group. The Agency had only one-COMOR.51 The main conflicts between the requirements committee and the military services arose over missions in the Far East. In the early I 960s, North Vietnam had not been designated a denied area by the US Intelligence Board (USIB), so the military services could plan missions there without consulting COMOR. Such missions. however, came very close to China. which was a denied area and, therefore, came under COMOR ·s area of responsibility. Once the war in Southeast Asia escalated in 1964, the military services received re sponsibility for the entire area (see chapter 5). To reduce the number of disputes between the competing CIA and Air Force reconnaissance programs and to manage the growing satellite program, the two agencies worked out an agreement to pro vide overall coordination for reconnaissance activities at the national level. The first such interagency agreement came in the fall of 1961, and it was followed by three additional agreements during the next four years. 50 Interest in coordinating the reconnaissance efforts of the military services and the CIA also affected the field of photographic interpre tation. In the wake of the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 on I May 1960, the President's Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities (PFIAB) had urged the establishment of an interagency group to study ways to improve the entire US intelligence community. Formed on 6 May 1960, the Joint Study Group on Foreign Intelligence Activities met for the next seven months under the lead ership of Lyman Kirkpatrick, CIA Inspector General. One of the study group's key recommendations in the report it issued in December 1960 was the creation of a national photointerpretation '' Ibid (TS Codeword). " Problems of classitication prevent a more detailc:d discussion of this aspect of the recon naissance program. which will be covered in a future history of satellite reconnaissance at a higher level of classification. Seeret
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.