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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

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“The Advance”34 pages

  • p. 6 …255 The Phaseout of the Office of Special Activities ........ ................... 257 0 ) Chapter 6 The U-2…
  • p. 7 …319 Advances in Technology............................................... ........................... 320 Cooperation With the Air Force ............................................................. 321 Impact of the Overhead Reconnaissance…
  • p. 22 …retired from the Air Force to become the assistant director of Lockheed's Advanced Development Program…
  • p. 24 11 / Chapter 1 gravity (g's) instead of the military specification strengLh of 5.33 g…
  • p. 32 …lithium deuteride, a tech nology more advanced than the heavy water method used by US '' BEACON…
  • p. 33 …between the developed and undeveloped nations. This aggressive Soviet foreign policy. combined with advances in nuclear…
  • p. 58 …secrecy in the new project, Kelly Johnson placed it in Lockheed's Advanced Development facility at…
  • p. 65 …His software algorithms made it possible to model lens designs and determine in advance the effects…
  • p. 76 …seen on pilot Francis Gary Powers) advanced gear for the U-2 pilots. David Clark expert…
  • p. 111 …of Soviet advances in long-range bombers and missiles. The initial sighting of the new Soviet…
  • p. 114 …Adenauer be informed in advance of US plans to overfly the Soviet Union from bases in…
  • p. 174 …concentrating on developing the more advanced solid-fueled missiles rather than increasing the num ber of…
  • p. 183 …if the Soviet SAMs received sufficient advanced warning, they posed a major threat to the U…
  • p. 191 …the cover story that had been prepared and distributed in advance of the mission. The first…
  • p. 206 …In 1965 the head of OSA received a new title, Director of Special Activities. The Office…
  • p. 235 …STPOLLY added the more advanced Lockheed P3A in 1963. Between 1955 and 1967, when the CIA…
  • p. 249 …The Defense Department feared that the loss of this device with its highly advanced traveling-wave…
  • p. 250 …Chapter 5 Advanced ECM Equipment for Detachment H Demand for overhead photography of the PRC continued…
  • p. 252 …In addition, the Project TACKLE U-2s began receiving even more advanced ECM • 60 equipment. •• Mission…
  • p. 265 …but some was the result of technological advances. The ini tial order for eight of the…
  • p. 266 …This camera was actually a very advanced version of the original B camera with a new…
  • p. 282 …aircraft from the small inventory of its most advanced bomber. Even had the B-588 program…
  • p. 295 …In fact, it was an advanced version of the highly reliable B camera developed for the…
  • p. 296 …Prospective pilots had to be qualified in the most advanced fighters and be emotionally stable and…
  • p. 307 …advanced experimental jet aircraft, the A-11. which has been tested in sustained flight at more…
  • p. 310 …It was now time to find work for the most advanced aircraft ever conceived and built…
  • p. 321 …advanced aircraft ever .built was to be put out to pasture. The aban donment of the…
  • p. 325 …when the OXCART program ended in the summer of 1968, no mcire advanced successor was wait…
  • p. 326 …The most advanced aircraft of the 20th century had become an anachronism before it was ever…
  • p. 333 …ADVANCES IN TECHNOLOGY One very important byproduct of the CIA's manned reconnaissance program was the…
  • p. 334 …the end of the usefulness of the world's most advanced aircraft; its offspring, the SR…
  • p. 335 …Thus, the CIA sponsored the development of the world's most advanced aircraft-the OXCART-and…
  • p. 352 …They believed that recent advances in the minia turization of electronic technology would make possible the…
  • p. 356 343 Defense Research and Engineering, John Foster, liked the concept and provided DOD funding for ORD…
189
denied areas, whether by pho1ographic, EUNT. COMfNT, infrared,
RADINT, or ocher means... The only exception to COMOR 's area of
responsibil ity was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct
support of actively combatant forces ." s,
By this lime the Air Force had developed a large overhead re
connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa
sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibili1y of
COM OR and the military services for colleccion requiremencs. The
Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958. when it claimed
that the While House had given responsibility for peripheral recon
naissance of the Soviet Union 10 the military. DCI Dulles, who was
always reluctan1 to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in
the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this clai m. and the
Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for
peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements comm ittee study.
which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho
tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union.5! The last CIA
U-2 miss ion along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June
. 1958; thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA
were those along the Soviet Union·s southern border with Iran and
Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan and Turkey under covert arrange
ments with the host governments.
Until the spri ng of 1961 , there was virtually no coordination of
military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services.
Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command
conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the
growing need for overall coordination of these activiti es at the na
tional level, the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint
Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint
Staff. The JRC immed iately began to coordinate and obtain approval
for approximately 500 missions per month, assigning each a risk fac
tor of Critical. Sensitive, Unique, or Routi ne. The JRC then prepared
a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions
and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The
C[A received a copy of the Activities Book.
" DCID '217. cffo::1.:tive 9 August 1960 (S ).
·'' Memorandum for DCI McCon.: from James Q. Reber. Chai rman. COMOR. "Proposo::<l
Procedure~ for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance. " 2 1 March 1962. COMIREX r~cor<ls
(TS Co<kwor<l).
See. et NOFORN
Chapter 4
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.