Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Burbank”10 pages
189 denied areas, whether by pho1ographic, EUNT. COMfNT, infrared, RADINT, or ocher means... The only exception to COMOR 's area of responsibil ity was "reconnaissance and aerial surveillance in direct support of actively combatant forces ." s, By this lime the Air Force had developed a large overhead re connaissance program of its own, including a fleet of U-2s, and, occa sionally, there were conflicts between the areas of responsibili1y of COM OR and the military services for colleccion requiremencs. The Air Force had already won a major victory in 1958. when it claimed that the While House had given responsibility for peripheral recon naissance of the Soviet Union 10 the military. DCI Dulles, who was always reluctan1 to become involved in matters that seemed to lie in the military's area of responsibility, did not resist this clai m. and the Ad Hoc Requirements Committee stopped preparing requirements for peripheral flights. This ended a major requirements comm ittee study. which sought to estimate what could be gained from U-2 oblique pho tography along the entire border of the Soviet Union.5! The last CIA U-2 miss ion along the Soviet Union's coasts occurred on 22 June . 1958; thereafter, the only peripheral missions conducted by the CIA were those along the Soviet Union·s southern border with Iran and Afghanistan from bases in Pakistan and Turkey under covert arrange ments with the host governments. Until the spri ng of 1961 , there was virtually no coordination of military reconnaissance activities, even within the individual services. Each commander of a Theater or a Unified and Specified Command conducted his own independent reconnaissance activities. To meet the growing need for overall coordination of these activiti es at the na tional level, the Joi nt Chiefs of Staff (JCS) established the Joint Reconnaissance Center (JRC) under the J-3 (Operations) of the Joint Staff. The JRC immed iately began to coordinate and obtain approval for approximately 500 missions per month, assigning each a risk fac tor of Critical. Sensitive, Unique, or Routi ne. The JRC then prepared a monthly Activities Book giving details of the proposed missions and briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the more risky missions. The C[A received a copy of the Activities Book. " DCID '217. cffo::1.:tive 9 August 1960 (S ). ·'' Memorandum for DCI McCon.: from James Q. Reber. Chai rman. COMOR. "Proposo::<l Procedure~ for Approval of Critical Reconnaissance. " 2 1 March 1962. COMIREX r~cor<ls (TS Co<kwor<l). See. et NOFORN Chapter 4 Seerct
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.