Documents / Official release
This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."
From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.
“Mission Control”27 pages
187 See, el NGfiOAN Chapter 4 the U-2 project under the title Operation Overflight. Later he flew a light plane as a traffic reporter for a Los Angeles radio station and then a helicopter for a television station. On l August 1977, he and a cameraman from the station died when his helicopter crashed on the • -19 way to an assignment. CHANGES IN OVERFLIGHT PROCEDURES AFTER MAY 1960 One of the most important changes in the overflight program after the loss of Francis Gary Powers' U-2 was the institution of more formal procedures for the approval of U-2 missions. During the first four years of U-2 activity, very few members of the Eisenhower adminis tration had been involved in making decisions concerning the over flight program. The President personally authorized all flights over the Soviet Union and was consulted by Richard Bissell and either the DCI or the DDCI about each such proposed mission. In addition to CIA officials, the President's discussions of individual U-2 missions or of the program as a whole generally included the Secretary of State or his Under Secretary, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs_of Staff, the Secretary of Defense or his deputy. and the President's secretary. Colonel (later General) Goodpaster. The approval process under President Eisenhower was thus very unstructured. There was no formal approval body charged with re viewing overflight proposals; the President kept this authority in his hands and simply consulted with selected cabinet officials and advis ers before reaching a decision. In 1959 the U-2 program had gained a second approval authority when British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan became the approval authority for missions conducted by the RAF pilots in Detachment 8. The loss of Powers' U-2 in May 1960 led to major changes in the approval process. For all practical purposes, Prime Minister Macmillan ceased to be a source of approval because the RAF pilots who remained in the U-2 program did not conduct any more operational missions (although the use of British pilots was consid ered on several occasions). In the United States the approval process •• Beschloss. Mayday, pp. 396-401. Beschloss claims that Powers was tired by Lockheed for criticizing the Agency in his memoirs (which he had shown to the Agency in draft form). but Kelly Johnson's "U-2R Log" records on 25 September 1969: "We havt: no Right test activity at all. I must let Gary Powers go. Have protected him for about seven years. but he doesn't have an ATR (Air Transport Rating), so we have no other job for him-not even flying the Beechcraft." Seccet
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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.