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CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

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“Sea”42 pages

  • p. 16 …An RB-29 lost in the Sea of Japan on 13 June 1952 was probably also…
  • p. 38 …off to about 6 percent of its sea-level thrust. Finally, low structural load factors, like…
  • p. 62 …U-2 landing gear and pogos .Sea,et-
  • p. 69 …chap. 8, pp. 1-2 (TS Codeword); Miller, Lockheed U-2. pp. 19-20. Sea,at
  • p. 75 …a boiling point of 300°F at sea level. Manufacturing this special fuel required petroleum byproducts…
  • p. 80 …pounds heavier and delivered only 10.200 pounds of thrust at sea level; the resulting Secret
  • p. 89 …that they could not be flown at sea level faster than 190 knots in smooth air…
  • p. 98 …Sec.el NOfOftN Chapter 2 Sea,et
  • p. 102 …working on a cover story for over seas operations. It was important to have a plausible…
  • p. 115 North Sea First Overflights, 20 June - 5 July 1956 ) f\ Sweden .__,_,_"-.. ) ~ STOCICHOUil -~ ✓ vf!.Sea \f Finland…
  • p. 116 r/ o/ North Sea 1/'. AMSTERDAM ;, 0 0 Baltic S<la --- Mission 2013 4 July - - - Mission…
  • p. 120 …Black SEia ~ q, TurkE~Y ~ ~111~ 13~ • ? ~ ...• o<) Mediterranean Sea () .. •• •,,, Malta (U.K.) Sec, et NOFORN ...... . . .. ·:. ·.•
  • p. 131 Mission 1316, 1 November 1956 Turkey Cyprus ', (U.K .) '· Mediterranean Sea lncirlik Airbase _/\ o/ t. </ \ f…
  • p. 139 …Soviet border from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea and on to Afghanistan. The System…
  • p. 146 …On 31 July, the same aircraft made a run over the Black Sea. There were a…
  • p. 148 …was the first to photograph the major Soviet space launch facility east of the Aral Sea…
  • p. 153 …of Soviet naval maneuvers in the Barents Sea. The final overflight of Detachment A , mission 2040…
  • p. 154 …K~ome<e,, tOO 200Miles Norwegian Sea Barents Sea Kola Peninsula '1'v Sweden f / Finlaind…
  • p. 155 …Norwegian radars tracked the overflights of the Barents Sea and Murmansk in October 1957, and Col…
  • p. 157 …well within international airspace above the Black Sea, as was the case on 27 October I957…
  • p. 158 …it turned abruptly upward over the Bering Sea just west of Alaska, climbed to 110,000…
  • p. 166 …the Soviet border and over the Black Sea without entering Soviet airspace. In late August, as…
  • p. 179 Baltic ~a Finland Black Sea Tu • ' -···1~- ..... ;.. :~.: ~~~~ •' :~·f.:~<,,· ·ir.fa 0 First British Overflight, 6 December…
  • p. 185 …Because the Bodo airfield was involved in NATO maneuvers taking place in the Barents Sea area…
  • p. 215 …Caribbean Sea W- Caymanlsl"""5 I_U."-i ~,...~ _''-),.,, .";!:-, - Mission 3086 5 August Mission 3088 29 August…
  • p. 216 …Caribbean Sea lOOKiloml.it•~ 100 200 Mff.-s Guvtof Mex~co \\\ I \ Caribbean Sea Multiple missions…
  • p. 225 …forces were conducting an all-out air-sea-land drive against the rebel-held areas in…
  • p. 226 f. 0 0 IND/AN OCEAN 300 -- 300 IIOOMlloo .·' Philippine Sea
  • p. 240 …Philippine Sea South China Sea Philippines • SeGFet NOFOAl<J 72<1~ (IU)0428J 4o92
  • p. 248 …6eeret NOFORN Chapter 5 Sea,et
  • p. 257 …The use of peripheral missions prevented any further losses, although one aircraft crashed into the sea…
  • p. 288 275 Settee NOPORN Chapter 6 Radar testing of A-72 mockup Sea,et
  • p. 316 …Shortly before Leningrad, the A-12 would head west-southwest down the Baltic Sea, skirting the…
  • p. 317 …2 would be flying farther out to sea, safely beyond the range of all Soviet SAMs…
  • p. 350 …B B Afghanistan, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 11 August 1957 4039 McMurray Lahore B B…
  • p. 351 …A-2 Dushanbe, Tashkent, Tyuratam, Kazalinsk, Aral Sea 10 September 1957 4059 Hall Adana B A…
  • p. 369 …AQUILINE 304, 339-343 Arabs 256 Aral Sea 135 Arbenz, Jacobo 16 "Archangel-I" 262 "Archangel…
  • p. 371 358 &ee,et NQFQRN Index Baltic Sea 3, 303 Baltic states 104 Baltimore; Maryland 6, 9…
  • p. 373 …186, 201, 205, 208-209, 299, 327 Caspian Sea 126 catheterized 64 cathode-ray tube 267…
  • p. 382 …23-24, 109, 139, 143, 164 Kara Sea 142 Kazakh language 135 Kazakhstan 135 Kazan', Soviet…
  • p. 385 …301 mechanical fuel totalizer/counters 68 Mediterranean Sea 114, 116. 121, 140, 142, 153 medium-range…
  • p. 393 …Pennsylvania 222 Sea of Japan 3 Seaberg, John 8-9. 12. 35-36. 333 SEAFOAM 211…
7
was only 64,000 feet. Meanwhile Leghorn, frustrated by the rejection
of his original concept, had transferred to the Pentagon in early 1952
to work for Col. Bernard A. Schriever, Assistant for Development
Planning to the Air Force's Deputy Chief of Staff for Development.~
In his new position Leghorn became responsible for planning the
Air Force's reconnaissance needs for the next decade. He worked
closely with Charles F. (Bud) Wienberg-a colleague who had fol
lowed him from Wright Field-and Eugene P. Kiefer, a Notre
Dame-educated aeronautical engineer who had designed reconnais
sance aircraft at the Wright Air Development Center during World
War IL All three of these reconnaissance experts believed that the Air
Force should emphasize high-altitude photoreconnaissance.
Underlying their advocacy of high-altitude photoreconnaissance
was the belief that Soviet radars would not be able to track aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet. This assumption was based on the fact that
the Soviet Union used American-built radar sets that had been sup
plied under Lend-Lease during World War II. Although the SCR-584
(Signal Corps Radio) target-tracking radar could track targets up to
90,000 feet. its high power consumption burned out a key component
quickly, so this radar was normally not turned on until an early warn
ing radar had detected a target. The SCR-270 early warning radar
could be left on for much longer periods and had a greater horizontal
range (approximately 120 miles) but was limited by the curvature of
the earth to a maximum altitude of 40,000 feet. As a result, Leghorn,
Kiefer, and Wienberg believed that an aircraft that could ascend to
65,000 feet before entering an area being swept by the early warning
radar would go undetected, because the target-tracking radars would
not be activated.9
The problem with this assumption was that the Soviet Union, un
like Britain and the United States, had continued to improve radar
technology after the end of World War II. Even after evidence of im
proved Soviet radar capabilities became available, however, many ad
vocates of high-altitude overflight continued to believe that aircraft
flying above 65,000 feet were safe from detection by Soviet radars.
' Leghorn interview (S).
' Ivan A. Getting, interview by Donald E. Welzenbach, Los Angeles, 28 August 1988 (U).
Sec,et NOFORN
Chapter 1
SeeFet

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Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.