Documents / Official release

CIA-UAP-003, The Central Intelligence Agency and Overhead Reconnaissance; The U-2 and OXCART Programs, 1954-1974

Central Intelligence Agency · 1954 · 406 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is a Secret History Staff monograph by Gregory W. Pedlow and Donald E. Welzenbach of the Central Intelligence Agency, published in 1992. It gives a history of the CIA's manned overhead reconnaissance program from 1954 to 1974, covering the development and operation of the U-2 and the A-12 OXCART aircraft. It covers overflights of the Soviet Union, the 1960 downing of Francis Gary Powers, and later operations. One section is titled "U-2s, UFOs, and Operation BLUE BOOK."

From the source:Release of 2026-06-12 This CIA History Staff document chronicles the complete history of the U-2 and OXCART (A-12) high-altitude reconnaissance aircraft programs from 1954 to 1974, detailing their development, operations over the Soviet Union and other targets worldwide, the famous downing of Francis Gary Powers in 1960, organizational reforms following that incident, and the eventual transfer of operations from CIA to Air Force control. A more redacted version of this document has been available on CIA's public website.

  • p. 13 …Without their help a good deal of this story could never have become known. The assistance…
  • p. 44 …the CL-282; in fact, there may never have been a formal decision as such. In…
  • p. 74 …Ry, Lockheed engineers had to solve problems never before encountered. Among these problems w21s the need…
  • p. 84 …Flight tests continued, with the U-2 ascending to alti tudes never before attained in sustained…
  • p. 102 …put aside for further thought (which it never received), and Bissell 's weather research cover re…
  • p. 147 …Peninsula, because of bad weather and, therefore, never entered Soviet airspace. A second attempt to photograph…
  • p. 157 …2 flight over the Black Sea that never violated Soviet airspace revealed 12 attempts at interception…
  • p. 159 …Six of the men on board were killed and the remaining 11 were never heard from…
  • p. 160 …Although this new Berlin crisis never became as threat,ening as the blockade of l 948…
  • p. 165 …The Air Force never equipped its orig inal U-2s with the 175 engines. 10" Detachment…
  • p. 189 …Powers never made it past Sverdlovsk. Four and a half hours into the mission, an SA…
  • p. 194 …program in I 974, but RAF pilots never again conducted an overt1ight in an Agency U…
  • p. 208 …very good reason, and such a situation never developed, in part because satellite photography gradually began…
  • p. 210 …Since this never happened, Francis Gary Powers' flight on l May 1960 proved to be the…
  • p. 223 …Responsibility for photo graphic coverage of Cuba remained with the Air Force; Agency pil,ots never…
  • p. 227 …Both were expe rienced with World War II aircraft, although Vito had never flown the rebels…
  • p. 248 …It was short of both pilots and planes and never had more than three U-2s…
  • p. 257 …This was an electronic intelligence mission that, in ac cordance with the new guidelines, never came…
  • p. 264 251 Seu et NOFOAN Chapter 5 There was never another Agency U-2 mission from an…
  • p. 290 …the OXCART aircraft for its own use. never adopted the laminated vertical stabii izers." THE OXCART…
  • p. 294 …Scott employed concepts never be fore used in camera systems. These included the use of a…
  • p. 298 …As it turned out, the 158 was never used in a Navy aircraft. "OSA History. chap…
  • p. 299 …This new delay was caused by leaking fuel tanks, a problem that would never be solved…
  • p. 303 …the J58 had to reach performance levels never before achieved by a jet engine. while operating…
  • p. 313 …even though the SKYLARK contingency plan was never put into effect. Since U-2s continued to…
  • p. 316 …Moreover, the Soviets never operated the radars in the tracking and lockon modes, a fact that…
  • p. 317 …strongly opposed it and the 303 Committee never forwarded the proposal to President Johnson. 5" The…
  • p. 318 …The OXCART, which had never operated in heavy rain, taxied to the runway and took off…
  • p. 326 …collector of strategic intelligence, the OXCART was never used for this purpose. Its brief deployment was…
  • p. 328 …the President never went so far as to eliminate the overflight program. As Commander in Chielf…
  • p. 333 …its speed and altitude have never been equaled. The development of this aircraft also led to…
  • p. 348 …a 16-kilogram VHF recorder for communications intelligence (COMINT), was never used and was transferred to…
  • p. 349 …a mission over the Soviet Union that never took place. Systems-XI through XV were ECM…
  • p. 356 …Project SANDY HOOK never advanced very far in develop ment; projected high costs and substantial technical…
186
Sec, et NO,-OPU~
Chapter 4
snubbed by President Kennedy, who one year earlier had warmly wel
comed two Air Force RB-47 fliers released by the Soviet Union.
McCone remained hostile to Powers. and in April 1963 he awarded
the Intelligence Star to all of the U-2 pilots except Powers. Finally on
25 April 1965, just two days before McCone's resignation became ef
fective, Powers received the Star (which was dated 1963 on the back)
from DDCI Marshall S. Carter:6
Powers' return from captivity raised the question of what his fu
ture employment should be. This issue had already been discussed
one year earlier by John N. McMahon, executive officer of the DPD.
who noted that he and Col. Leo P. Geary (the Air Force project offi
cer) were concerned about a major dilemma for the CIA and the US
Government: " On the one hand we have gone to considerable lengths
to prove that the U-2 program was a civilian undertaking and not mil
itary aggression; on the other hand there is on fi le a document that
assures Francis Gary Powers that if he so desires he may be reinstated
into the USAF.'' On 21 March 1961 McMahon wrote:
If we grant him [Powers/ the right that is now his, namely rein
statement in the Air Force, then we would be subjecting our
selves to probable adverse propaganda by the USSR. Admitting
little appreciation for the finer points of political and psycholog
ical warfare, should Francis Gary Powers return to the USAF I
suspect that the Soviets would have a "PP" field day illustrating
our big lie. The question then. since we cannot permit Powers to
return to the USAF. is what do we do with him."
Despite this negative recommendation, the Air Force agreed on
4 April I 962 to reinstate Powers effective I July, a decision that was
approved by the Agency, State Dep•artment, and White House. Then
Powers· divorce proceedings began. and the Air Force, concerned
about adverse publicity, postponed reinstatement until the end of the
proceedings. In the meantime Pow1ers began working for Lockheed
as a U-2 pilot. In March 1963, he met with Colonel Geary to discuss
his future plans and decided to stay with Loc kheed."11 Powers re
mained at Lockheed until U-2 testing ceased in September 1969.
Earlier in the year, he had published an account of his experiences on
"' OSA Hiswry, chap. 14. p. 54 (TS Codeword): Beschloss. Mayday. p. 397.
" John N. McMahon to Chief. Cover Staff. DPD. 21 March I 961. Operation MUDLARK
files. OSA records. job 74-B-605. box 6 (S).
" OSA History. chap. 14, p. 52 (TS Codeword).

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

Official release, from the pursue collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 406 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.